





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John E. Miller

Dec 1978





A foul Copy of one intended for the Cave, in
Ken's garden's, by order of the Queen.

Books Quoted.

- The Christian Belief. in Answer to χ^t not Mysterious. Br. 2^d. 1697.
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Or Th: Burnets Demonstration
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Bⁿ: King on the Origin of Evil: by Law: 2^d Edⁿ. 1732.
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I was preparing these for the Cave by order.

1735.

NOTES
AND
ANNOTATIONS
ON
LOCKE
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,

WRITTEN

By ORDER of the QUEEN;


CORRESPONDING IN SECTION AND PAGE WITH THE
EDITION OF 1793.

By THOMAS MORELL, D. D.
RECTOR OF BUCKLAND, & F. S. S. R. & A.

L O N D O N:

Printed for G. SAEL, Newcastle Street, Strand..

1794.



P R E F A C E.

THE reputation of Mr. Locke is too well known to stand in need of any eulogium, and every publication tending to elucidate so valuable a production as his *ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING*, cannot but excite the attention and be worthy the patronage of the *Literati*; more especially so when issuing from the pen of Dr. Morell, of whom the late Lord Lyttelton has given the following pleasing character:

“ He certainly deserves well of, and is
“ esteemed by, the learned world; but the acute
“ critic and profound grammarian seems to be
“ impelled rather by the love of science, than
“ the desire of gain,—is generally in the habit
“ of frugal contentment, and hides himself in
“ that shade of retirement, where the learned
“ few alone can find him. I am, however,
“ entirely

“ entirely of opinion, that he merits a less re-
“ strained situation than he possesses; and I
“ cannot forgive Dr. B—— for a breach of
“ justice in opposing his election to a fellow-
“ ship at Eton. Such a promotion would have
“ been a suitable reward for his labours, and
“ have afforded him that ample independence,
“ and learned retreat, which would have left
“ his closing life without a wish.”*

The Doctor finished his long, well-spent life with every tribute due to his memory, when, amongst other manuscripts in his own handwriting, the following *ingenious production* was found; which, with a part of his valuable library, came into the possession of the present Publisher, where the *original* may be *seen*; and, with great propriety, may claim a place as an appendage to the works of Locke lately reprinted.

* See Lord Lyttelton's Letters.

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

ON

L O C K E

ON

THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CORRESPONDING WITH

THE EDITION OF 1793.

BOOK I.

C H A P. I.

Introduction.

§ 8, page 6. **I**T is the *thing as it exists in the mind* by way of conception or representation, that is properly called the *Idea*, whether the object be absent or present.*

And accordingly he uses it sometimes for the thoughts or conceptions themselves *in* the mind, and sometimes for the things themselves *without* the mind, that are the objects of its thoughts; and this often in the same sentence, and without any distinction; which creates great difficulty in the understanding his meaning.†

There is no *idea* in the mind, but when it has some resemblance, picture, image, or likeness of that which is without it, and never occurs but in that act of the

* Watts Log. p. 9. † Lee, p. 1.

mind which is commonly called *Imagination*; and therefore whenever it is used in any other sense, it is *metaphorical and improper*.*

Page 7. Idea nomine intelligo cujuslibet cogitationis formam illam, per cujus immediatam perceptionem ipsius cogitationis ejusdem conscius sum. Adeo ut nihil possim verbis exprimere intelligendo id quod dico, quin ex hoc ipso certum sit, in me esse ideam ejus quod verbis illis significatur. Atque ita non solas imagines in Phantasia depictas ideas voco: imo ipsas hic nullo modo ideas voco, quatenus sunt in Phantasiâ corporea hoc est, in parte aliqua cerebri depicta, sed quatenus mentem ipsam in illam cerebri partem conversam informant. This is very express and full, agreeably to Mr. Locke's acceptance of the word *idea*.†

CHAP. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

§ 1, page 13. **BY** innate speculative principles are meant such general truths as the mind in all its reasonings, arguings, and judgements always and necessarily supposes true, as it does the truth of its own faculties.‡ They are called *Innate*, because as soon as we perceive or judge at all, we cannot but judge their parts have the relation between them, as is expressed in them: *Speculative*, because they do not immediately influence our external actions: *Principles*, because all other propositions, which are more particular, or whose parts are less common names than they are, are and must be resolved into them, or identical propositions as they are themselves, or negation of that identity, before we can be certain of their truth,

* Lee, p. 1. † Baxt. N. p. 310.

‡ Watts Log. p. 8. Athen. Or. v. 2, 208. Vide Dialogues concerning Innate Principles, &c. 8vo. 1779. M. Rev. May, 1779.

And in this sense only, I conceive, any thoughts or perceptions can be said to be *innate*, viz. because the powers or faculties of the mind to form such thoughts or perceptions are derived from the Author of *Nature*, operating upon it by *necessary* causes; but the *actual* perceptions or thoughts must be owned to be *acquired*; because they proceed from causes *extraneous* to the mind itself, and this I take to be all this author means, and therein I believe no one will differ from him. But it is to be observed on the other side, that besides the *natural* capacities or powers of perceiving, affirming, doubting, &c. with which every intelligent is born, it is born also with a *native* aptness, inclination, or propensity of *forming* some thoughts rather than others; of judging some propositions *true* rather than *false*; some actions *good* rather than *bad*; and this without the help of any *words* or any *teaching*. And such thoughts and propositions we call *innate* or *natural*, though there be no such *actual* thoughts or propositions born with the mind itself, or which it brings into the world with it. So *Tully* speaking of self-defence or self-preservation in favour of *Milo* says, *Est hæc non scripta, sed nata lex*; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus: verum ex *natura* ipsâ arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti, sed facti; non instituti, sed imbuti sumus.*

§ 5, page 14. If there is any strength in this argument, it is thrown away by the author himself: who plainly reckons embryos no other than vegetables, infants no better than brutes, and ideots a sort of animals between men and brutes, and therefore if all, that *do* or *can* make any judgement, do judge these propositions true, then *universal* consent is sufficiently secured.†

* *Lee.* † *Ibid.* p. 7.

Implanted senses, instincts, appetites, passions, and affections, are a remnant of the old philosophy, which used to call every thing innate that it could not account for; and therefore it is to be wished they were in one sense all eradicated; which was undoubtedly the aim of this excellent book: but it may be observed, that every argument built upon these senses, &c. will be equally conclusive, whether they be implanted or acquired.*

§ 16, page 21. The reason of this is, because he perceives the subject and predicate of the former proposition to be the *same*, but not so in the greater number. For as for *ideas* he has no other of two and three than of nineteen and thirty-eight, i. e. none at all; we have no abstract *idea* of any number whatever, not so much as of *unity*.†

§ 18, page 23. The *power* of perceiving the relation between the parts of all propositions, of the truth of which any one is certain, is equally *innate*; but when we come to exercise that power, the difference is as plainly discoverable as between persons, temper, or frame of mind or body.‡

§ 19, page 24. *Such less, &c.* This I own to be right in all truths acquired by experience, and wholly by the senses, but not in such as are acquired by the mind's exercising of its *innate* power of judging and comparing; which does not wholly depend upon the information we receive by our *senses*.§

§ 23, page 27. I answer, only the disposition or aptness to judge of the truth of those propositions

* Law on King. p. 88.

‡ Lee, p. 10.

† Lee, p. 9.

§ Ibid. p. 5.

rather than the contrary, or to doubt of them, and that is enough to give the propositions that title, without actual perception of the *particulars*.*

§ 27, page 30. Children are not *conscious* of, or do not remember these principles, yet all their actions are governed by them, and which argues a sense or knowledge of them.†

§ 28, page 32. All these arguments are so far from convincing me that there are no truths but what are *acquired*, (for that is the whole drift of this chapter) that as it is in painting, and all sorts of manufactures, the nearer they come to the imitation of nature, so in all *acquired*, the nearer they come to those *innate* or *natural* truths, the clearer or more certain perception of *identity*, or its *negation*, is the measure of *certainty*, not the agreement or disagreement in *ideas*.‡

CHAP. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.

§ 1, page 33. **B**y *innate practical principles* are meant such propositions as contain an *immutable obligation* upon all single persons and societies to conform their *practices* to the sense of them. They are called *practical*, because they influence external actions; *propositions*, because they have all the essential parts of a proposition, viz. subject, predicate, and copula. They are likewise called *laws*, because they have all the essential parts of a *law*, authority, promulgation, sanction. *Promulgation*, because every one that can judge at all, or can do good or harm, judges them true: *Authority*, because impressed on our minds by the Author of Nature: *Sanction*, because rewards or punish-

* Lee, p. 8.

† Ibid. p. 10.

‡ Ibid. p. 11.

ments are *naturally* entailed upon the observance or non-observance of them.*

§ 1, page 33. All moral rules are as generally and readily assented to as any *self-evident speculative* principles; and the reason they have not a constant effect is, because some passions or other overpower those *natural* inclinations, but do not destroy them, no more than other bodies destroy the natural *conatus* of heavy bodies to descend, though they hinder the effect at present.†

§ 2, page 34. If *convenience* be such an inseparable and remarkable consequence of the observance of that rule, that the worth of men see it is their interest to observe it; this, one would think, was a good argument, that the connexion between the observance of that rule, and that effect of it, was *natural*, and therefore deservedly reckoned a *law of nature*.‡

§ 3, page 34. This objection would be of great weight, if men were *pure spirits*, or only the masterpiece of *mechanism*; but as they are *free* agents, and have a sense of their own, of moving their own and other bodies within certain limits, &c. I cannot see any necessity that their *actions* should be the constant interpreters of their *thoughts*, or why they may not act contrary to those *innate* principles of knowledge which they have, or by the violence of passion be hindered from attending to those rules of action which they judge best. Neither is there any reason why the law of nature should *necessarily* operate upon minds of men more than human laws, or why their not operating upon all persons casts a greater blemish on the Author of

* Ibid. p. 11. King de Orig. Mali. Sherlock on a Fut. St. p. 124. Pearson on the Creed, p. 20. Puffend. Law of Nat. l. 2, c. 3. § 13. Sharrock de fin. p. 168. Cumb. de Leg. Nat.

† Lee, p. 13. ‡ Ibid. p. 15.

Nature, as if he formed them to no purpose, than the non-observance of human laws by any subjects, derogates from the honour of the lawgivers.*

§ 4, page 35. There may be occasion indeed to explain the words of a *practical* proposition, (as there may of a *speculative*); but there needs no argument to convince any unprejudiced person of the *fitness* of observing it, after he knows the sense of the words.

This *practical* proposition, *Do as you would be done unto*, carries its own evidence and reasonableness with it; and though it wants *explication*, yet needs no *proof*: for every one understands, that what is equal in one man's case is equal in another's.†

§ 3, page 36. The Christian, Hobbist, and Heathen, may give different reasons, and use *different* expressions to add new force to a law of nature; but needs *none* sufficiently to convince an unprejudiced person of his obligation to observe it, but what the wise Author of Nature has suggested before. And their very agreeing to give *different* reasons shews, that nature *operates equally* in them all, in disposing them to use such enforcements.‡

§ 6, page 36. The *profitableness* of virtue rather proves it is *innate*; for where an effect is *constant*, there the cause is the Author of Nature. We do not pretend that the laws of nature so *irresistibly operate* as to make men wise and honest against their wills, but only *incline* them to be such, for their own interest, security, and happiness. *Hypocrisy* proves that it is most *natural* to be really good.§

§ 7, page 37. Men's actions convince us indeed that all men are not so good as to govern themselves

* Lee, p. 16. † Ibid. p. 16. ‡ Ibid. p. 17. § Ibid. p. 18.

by the *natural* sense they have of what is good : but not that those persons do not act contrary to their own consciences, unless we can suppose every man as good as he *knows* himself obliged to be.*

§ 8, page 38. Education, custom, company, and human laws, may add *new* force to the laws of nature; but if there be no foundations laid in the constitution of our natures, for the distinction between virtue and vice *antecedent* to them, I doubt they will prove but *weak* and *uncertain*, because they will depend upon contingent causes; and the consequence of this doctrine will prove very *dangerous* to the foundation of *morality* and *natural religion*. But though false notions in religion may go a great way to corrupt men's manners and tempers, yet we never heard of any that were so far corrupted as to own it lawful to kill an innocent person, or break any law of nature merely out of *conscience*. It is not *conscience*, (whatever is pretended) but some *irregular passion*, mingled with *religious phrenzy*, that oftentimes proves so venomous and mischievous.†

§ 9, page 38. Admitting these practices to be true, yet they do not prove that these people were *wholly ignorant* of the laws of nature, only that they were such monsters of men as not to *regard and attend* to them as they ought;‡ besides, in all these instances, there is no mention of any laws of the country to oblige the people to these enormities. It is one thing *not to punish* or *allow* another to *command* or *reward*. But suppose they were commanded, yet that would not demonstrate that they *know no better*. There is a famous instance to the contrary in the *Romans* expedition against *Cyprus*. And therefore to make any of these practices

* Lee, p. 12. † Ibid. p. 19.

‡ See this objection answered in § 11.

a convincing argument against *innate* principles of morality and religion, there must be proof, that the persons who committed them were under no prejudices, under the power of no passions, fear, or hopes of more present advantages or disadvantages than what nature suggests for the contrary practices.

For the whole state of the question is, not whether men *can* act contrary to these *principles* or not; for in that point there is no dispute: nor whether they be stamped upon the souls of all men as soon as they are united to their bodies; that is an idle thing to talk for or against; but whether human nature be not so constituted by the wise Author of it, as to be more inclined to the observance of some rules of action, for the promoting their own, and the happiness of mankind, than the breach of them; or in other words, whether all men, or any one man, is *free* from all *sense* of duty, and *indifferent* to all sorts of actions? And I appeal to the sense of mankind, whether they do not feel, within themselves, an *inclination* to one, and an *abhorrence* to the other sort of actions, such as are here mentioned; and this *abhorrence* I call natural conscience, and is a demonstration, that we are all born with an inclination to the observance of those rules we call the laws of nature.*

§ 10, page 40. This may be owned true, and yet be no good proof that those rules of morality are not founded in nature, unless it be proved, that those people who do or have slighted them, have, all things considered, fared the *better* for it.†

§ 13, page 43. I allow there is such a thing, which may be called a *moral sense*, in the mind, which inclines a man to judge right, and especially in the more general, plain, and obvious queries about virtue

* Lee, p. 21. † Ibid. p. 23.

and vice: But this moral sense is still the same thing: It is intelligence or reason itself, considered as capable of discerning, discoursing, or judging about moral subjects. And it contains the plain and general principles of morality, not explicitly as propositions, but only as native principles, and cannot but judge virtue to be fit, and vice unfit, for intelligent and social creatures whom God hath made.*

§ 14, page 44. As for *practical* propositions there are so many of them as there are *moral* rules for *human* actions; in the observance of which, the natural happiness of mankind in general, and of every individual person, all things considered, is promoted, and which every one does, and must know, that knows any thing. And we call them *the laws of nature*, because, in the common course of the world, there are rewards or punishments annexed to the observance or breach of them, antecedent to human laws, and are therefore derivable from no less or other cause, than the Author of Nature, the cause of all necessary effects. And that there are such *laws of nature*, is manifest from these reasons:

1st, Were there no such *immutable* laws of nature, antecedent to all human institutions, all actions would be in themselves *indifferent*.

2d, From the *consciousness* some emperors and princes have of their *evil* actions, when they knew themselves out of the reach of human penalties.

3d, From nature's powerful efficacy in vicious persons at the approach of death.

4th, Some laws of nature seem to have a deeper root than mere custom, education, or the hopes of human rewards, or fears of human punishments, could plant; because human laws themselves derive their whole or

* Watts Ess. p. 111.

main strength from those very laws of nature, and are more or less valid as they are more or less agreeable to those natural laws, or sooner or later resolved into them.*

CHAP. IV.

Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

§ 1, page 55. **T**HERE is no need of *ideas*, i. e. of an actual knowledge of present thoughts of the subject and predicate in general propositions, to the forming a certain judgement of their truth, but only a *readiness* of mind to assent to them as soon as the things signified by the words are proposed; and to form them into verbal propositions, as soon as the words are understood. And because that *power* in the mind of comparing its own thoughts is *natural* to all intelligent beings, and that there is no need of the information of any of our senses concerning all the particulars implied in those *general* words, therefore such propositions may be called *innate*.†

§ 2, page 55. As for children's not having *ideas*, or notions which *answer the terms which make up those general propositions*, it is nothing to the purpose, for grown men cannot have any such ideas. No man can have *ideas* of all the wholes in the world, and of all the parts of those wholes; yet a child that knows, or can judge of any thing, can certainly know and judge, that all wholes are bigger than any one of its parts; and so of all other *innate* truths.‡

§ 8, page 57. By the *idea* of God is meant, the notion we have of a being distinct from ourselves, and every other *finite* being; the infinitely wise, good,

* Lee, p. 14.

† Ibid. p. 26.

‡ Ibid.

and powerful *Author of Nature*, or *primary* cause of all *necessary* effects in the universe. And such an *idea*, or notion of God, may be called *innate*, because it is formed in the minds of men, without any *teaching*, or *artificial* arguments, or so much as the knowledge of words, by the efficacy of natural causes operating upon us, and the unavoidable observation of such effects as can proceed from no less or other cause, than such as we all mean by the word *God*.*

The ancients recorded for Atheists, are *Protagoras*, *Diagoras*, *Melissus*, *Theodorus Cyrenaicus*, &c. But *Tully*, in the very period in which he gives us their names, makes the *belief* of a God *natural* to all men, *quo omnes duce natura vehimur*; and *Seneca* says, *mentiuntur qui dicunt se non sentire Deum esse; nam etsi tibi affirmant interdum, noctu tamen, et sibi dubitant*. And *Epicurus*, that took so much pains to free himself and others of their *natural* fears of God, is represented by his contemporaries, to have been one of the most *fearful* men in the world, of death, and the gods.

It is scarce possible to know the sense of whole nations in their disowning the existence of God, or to know they had no name for the *natural* notion of God, unless we were to speak with every single person, or understood every single word of their language, which is impracticable. Their having mean and unworthy thoughts of God, is no proof they had no thoughts of God any more than it does that our common people have none of the sun, because they judge it not much bigger than the crown of their hats.†

Deos esse inter alia sic colligimus, quod omnibus de diis opinio insita est; nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moreque projecta, ut non aliquos deos credat.‡

* Lee, p. 29. § 8, Baxt. 241. † Lee, p. 34. ‡ Ep. 117.

§ 9, page 57. If every man did necessarily feel light and heat, as he is conscious of his own existence, then he would as naturally infer that there were some such things as we call the sun and fire, as he that is conscious of his own existence infers from thence the existence of something distinct from, and superior to himself; and extending his thoughts to other effects of the visible world, he enlarges his thoughts concerning the nature and perfections of God by such *natural* and *unavoidable* impressions from external objects, without the help of teaching or words, as he may do of the fire or the sun, by such *natural* effects which come from such causes.*

§ 14, page 98. However the Heathen world differed from each other in the nature and number of their inferior deities, and in their customs, languages, and modes of worship, yet they all agreed in this that there was *one God*, the cause or supreme Author of Nature, and of all happiness and calamities, which is the most obvious and natural notion of God.†

§ 19, page 69. The simple ideas of light, colours, sounds, &c. even all *sensible* qualities (or *secondary* qualities of bodies) though they are not immediately, actually and implicitly impressed at once upon the mind, at its first union to the body, yet they may in some sense be called *innate*: for they seem given to the mind by a divine energy, or law of union between soul and body, appointed in the first creation of man. And this law operates, or begins its efficacy in all particular instances, as soon as those sensible objects occur, which give occasion to these sensible qualities and ideas to be first perceived by the mind.

So some principles of knowledge (though not explicit propositions) may be in a sense *innate* also,—

* Lee, p. 34.

† Ibid. p. 35.

though they are not actually inscribed on the mind of man in its first formation, yet the very nature, make and frame of a rational mind is such, that it cannot but judge according to such axioms, as *whatsoever* acteth hath a being, &c. They are, (as Mr. Glanvil calls them) the very essentials of rationality: and if any one ask how the soul came by them, I answer, as *quantity* did by length, breadth, and depth.*

Therefore I take the mind or soul of men not to be so perfectly indifferent to receive all impressions, as a *rasa tabula*, or white paper, &c.†

§ 20, page 69. It is full as easy to conceive how the Author of our Natures in the frame of our souls and bodies, may make it easy and natural to judge a proposition true, as soon as the words of it are understood, though we had not before any *actual* knowledge of the subject and predicate, as it is to make us perceive or remember any thing, which we have not in our thoughts at that instant.‡

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

Of Ideas, in General, and their Original.

§ 2, page 77. **I**T is commonly thought, that the minds of men come by all their knowledge either by the immediate exercise of their own *natural powers*, in their several manners of operation about their several objects: or 2, by testimony *human* or *divine*.

The 1st *natural* power is sensation, i. e. the perception of those impressions which are made by *external* objects upon the several organs of the body framed for that purpose.

* Vide the Vanity of Dogmatizing, p. 81.

† Watts Ess. p. 106. ‡ Lee, p. 36.

The 2d is *imagination*, or the power of exciting in our minds the idea of any sort of object, which we have either seen ourselves before, or has been represented by others as visible or sensible.

The 3d is *understanding*, which is only the power of exciting in our minds, thoughts of things by articulate sounds, words written, or other sensible marks, and by the diligent exercise of this we acquire *wisdom*.*

The 4th is the *natural* power of judging, i. e. the comparing of those objects we have perceived or imagined, and by observing their agreement or disagreement with one another, we form propositions either negative or affirmative, modal or general.

The 5th is that of *reasoning*, which is the inferring the truth of *one* proposition from *another*, by observing the relation in which either of the terms of one proposition stands to another.

The 6th is *memory*, or the facility of thinking of a thing which we thought on before,† and the consciousness of what is thus perceived, imagined, understood, compared, inferred, or remembered, is what most men call *knowing*, or in the general sense of the *understanding*.‡

§ 3, 4, vide note on § 24, p. 91, concerning sensation and reflection, page 78. Though the first original of ideas may be entirely owing to these two principles, sensation and reflection; yet the recollection and fresh excitation of them may be owing to a thousand other occasions and occurrences in life.§

We obtain the knowledge of a multitude of propositions as well as of single ideas by those two principles which Mr. Locke calls sense and reflection.¶ One of them is a sort of consciousness of what affects the body, and the other of what affects the mind. Propositions

* Proceed. of the Underst. b. 3, c. 4. Jac. Ode Theol. Nat. p. 39. Watts Eff. p. 115.

† Vide Watts Eff. p. 75. ‡ Lee, p. 40.

§ Watts Log. p. 30. ¶ Watts Eff. p. 75.

which are built on this internal consciousness, have yet no particular or distinguishing name assigned to them.*

§ 5, page 79. The first of these propositions is clear enough: the second is not so. By the *mind*, he must mean the *thinking substance*; by the *understanding*, the *perceptive faculty*; by *ideas*, *perceptions*; by *operations*, the *actions* and *passions* of the mind. So that in the other proposition runs thus, the *thinking substance* furnishes the *thinking faculty* with the thoughts of its own thoughts: by all which he intends no more than this, that the mind is conscious of its own actions and passions.†

§ 6, page 79. But it is as observable, that as the objects increate upon them in variety, so the power of perceiving them does, and that power has another source besides the *objects* themselves: unless what we call *perception*, as in the mind, be nothing but what we call *motion* in the object.‡

§ 7, page 80. No one doubts this; but the question is, whether the *perceptive faculties* grow or be multiplied *purely* by the efficacy of the objects themselves, or acquired only from that cause, or a superior? Though the brain be the organ of the memory, yet it does not itself any more remember than the eye sees: and whatever motions may precede, accompany or follow imagination and reasoning; yet if there be not some one certain substance, call it the soul or what you please, that perceives all these various motions, that unites those various perceptions, that compares them upon occasion, that is conscious of all these transactions, they would perish the next moment, and the mind itself would be no more capable of *variety* in knowledge,

* Watts Log. p. 179.

† Lee, p. 44.

‡ Ibid.

than

than a piece of soft wax is of *different* impressions at the *same* instant.*

§ 10, page 81. *That actual thinking, &c.* The strength of all the *Cartesian* arguments to prove that *thinking* includes the *essential* or *distinguishing* property of a spirit, may be reduced to this one syllogism, and will be very difficult to find a reason to deny either of the propositions.†

That *with* which we may have a *clear* and *distinct* notion of a spirit, and *without* which we can have *no* notion of it at all, is the *essential* property of a spirit.

But *thinking* is that *with* which, &c.—*Ergo*,

§ 10, page 81. It is very improper to refer to *experience* in this case,‡ viz. for the reality of a state, which by supposition is an utter negation of all experience.

§ 10, page 81, line 11. But with submission, there is this material difference, motion is no more the action of matter than rest is, it is equally inactive in both. Matter stands in need of an external cause to put it in motion or bring it to rest again, but the soul does not want an external mover to set it a thinking. And therefore there is no room to run a comparison between the action of the soul, which necessarily springs out of its own nature, and the motion of matter, which must be excited in it by some being not material. This looks as if action was really extrinsic to them both; or as if it were as natural for the soul to be without action, as for matter to be without motion, which is to pervert our justest conceptions of spiritual substance.§

If we *take away from our idea*, or deny activity and perceptivity concerning spiritual substance, by which we can only collect it to be a substance, we deny every

* Lee, p. 44. † Vide Baxt. p. 144, 152. Vide Inf. 154.

‡ Vide Infr. p. 184. Baxt. p. 145. § Ibid. p. 146.

thing we know concerning it, or we deny ourselves to have any idea of it; and reasoning about it as without those powers, we reason precisely about nothing, of which we have any particular idea. To say it may still be a substance without these powers, is to suppose it *dead substance*, which could never come to the exercise of these powers again, if it had once lost them, as we see it doth. And therefore it can never be without them.*

Besides allowing Mr. Locke's acceptation of the word *essence* (3, 3, 15) it will not follow that every thing is separable from substances, which is not this real internal constitution as he seems to take for granted. The properties that immediately flow from the internal constitution of things are as inseparable from them as that constitution itself, and we can as little conceive the thing without these properties, as without that constitution.†

§ 10, page 81. *I confess myself, &c.* This *modesty*, which is designed for an argument, is somewhat inaccurate, for he confesses a thing for certain which he can never be certain of. It is not in the power of the soul to become impercipient of ideas at pleasure; and were the thing effected, it would be the sign of an ill-disposed body, and not of the dullness of the soul.

It is true the argument is good, that a man cannot think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it, but this respects the present time, and is far from concluding that a man cannot think sleeping or waking without retaining the memory of such thoughts, which yet is the thing designed to be concluded by it. Why else should experience be alledged, which is the memory of things past?‡

§ 10, page 81. *But I do say, &c.* This seems to be granting the inference he so much dreads; for if the

* Baxt. p. 145.

† Ibid. p. 146.

‡ Ibid. p. 148.

soul does not *think* when the man is asleep, we can have no reason to say that it *exists*; because we say that of a thing of which we have *no notion* at all, we say something of that of which, so far as we know, is *nothing*; and *nihili nulla sunt affectiones*.*

§ 10, page 81. The question here is rather about a matter of *not fact*, about a negation of all fact. Every body allows we are generally conscious. It is absurd to say, we forget our unconsciousness, or we remember our unconsciousness. Where is the matter of fact to be testified to them; or how is experience applicable? Let a definition of experience be given.†

§ 10, page 81. *It is hardly to be conceived that, &c.* If this argument proved any thing, it would prove too much; for it would prove, *we never dream*. For, I presume, all men's dreams are alike incoherent and *useless*; but such as they are, they are of use to prove, we may have *useless* thoughts, without any affront to the Majesty of our Creator.‡

§ 11, page 83. Sleep not an affection of the whole man.§

The soul acts not by itself so as to be a different person.||

§ 11, page 83. As to *consciousness*, it is impossible to prove or disprove it directly. It is probable that the mind, though there be a cessation of the *external* organs of *sense*, may perceive a constant *pleasure* in sound sleep, from the perpetual *steam of spirits* that are rising from the circulation of the blood, especially since that motion must needs be even and regular in sound sleep, or from other causes: and people suddenly

* Lee, p. 45. † Baxt. p. 148. Vide p. 184. ‡ Lee, p. 47.

§ Baxt. p. 199. || Ibid. p. 291.

awakened find a kind of *reluctancy*, at that instant, to be deprived of that *pleasure*. This I confess cannot be demonstrated, but much less the contrary; and there is this to be added to the probability of it, that our very dreams which we do remember, and the imagination we often have in them of *visible* objects, much *clearer* than awake, do manifestly evince that the perceptive principle in us does not wholly depend upon the external senses, for the exercise of all its natural powers; but can perform some of them without such a monitor, especially without being rid by the violence of *external* objects.*

§ 11, page 83. Who can say that he ever found himself in a state of unconsciousness? It is contradictory that any man should so surprize himself with respect to the time present; and as to the past time, he cannot have any memory of such a state; for whether ever such a state was or was not, it is either way a contradiction that he should remember it, and he cannot bring an argument for it from his not remembering of it. He did not perceive an absence of consciousness then; nor can he now; since he could only do it by remembrance. He hath not two distinct consciousnesses, one to be extinguished, and another remaining to perceive the absence of the first.†

It is strange if any man put him to the trouble of confuting this contradiction, with the supposition of Castor and Pollux, Socrates and Plato. The position his adversaries maintain, infers no such contradiction, nor justifies another to infer it for them. There is certainly a great deal of our past consciousness, which we retain no memory of afterward. It is a particular mark of our finite and imperfect natures, that we cannot become conscious of all our past consciousness at pleasure. But no man at night would infer, that he was not in a state of consciousness and thinking at such

* Lee, p. 46. † Vide Baxt. p. 147.

a certain time of day, because now, perhaps, he hath no memory what particular thought he had at that minute. And it is no better argument considered in itself, that a man was not conscious at such a minute in his sleep, because next morning he hath no memory of what ideas were in his mind then.*

§ 11, page 83. It is here granted, that while we are awake, we are under the necessity of thinking; how comes it then we are not always awake? Is it the defect of the soul? This was the chief point to be considered. But spirit hath no parts, and therefore stands in no need of reparation or re-disposing its parts aright, as the body doth, which consists of parts which are constantly changing, and liable to be disordered; this shews on which side the indisposition lies.†

§ 12, page 84. A man asleep may perceive, or think, and be conscious of it at that instant, and yet not retain the thoughts of it when awake; and that too without being, to all effects and purposes, two different persons for want of that memory. For if the want of memory was a sufficient reason to make different persons, then the same man might be an hundred men in the same day, by forgetting his several succeeding thoughts within that time. The supposition therefore of Castor's soul in Pollux's body while asleep, is a little too romantic; but it is levelled against the belief of some that the soul is a distinct substance from the body, and therefore, as he infers, may act apart; but as distinct substances as they are, yet there is a mutual communication between the *thoughts* of the soul and the *motions* of the body;‡ but the soul of one man can no more be in another man's body than one man can be conscious of another's thoughts, or feel his pain with the gout.§

* Vide Baxt. p. 149. † Ibid. p. 75.

‡ Baxt. p. 115. § Lee, p. 47.

§ 12, page 84. When we fall heavy with sleep, or sink from waking to a sleeping state, we lose gradually the perception of external objects or whatever we were thinking of, as the mind ceases to be active in applying the attention to them, till all degenerates into an internal scene of thinking, where the mind is still active, and perceptive of and about other objects.*

I cannot help being concerned to find some great and learned men taking the wrong side of ambiguous appearances, and falling in with the sceptical notions of the world, by insinuating, that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body; and this in order to maintain another hypothesis of no very great consequence in itself though it were true in this state of union, viz. that the soul thinks not always, which yet is not easily to be proved, even though the activity of spirit be clogged with dead matter, and is certainly false in a state of separation.†

§ 14, page 85. If we consider the temper of the brain, while we are fast asleep, partly by the plentiful resort of the animal spirits which used to be otherwise employed, partly by the continual recruit which sleep was designed to make; it cannot be conceived otherwise, but there must be a very quick succession of thought, and continual interfering and crossing of those spirits in their motions, and thereby hindering one another from making any distinct impressions in the brain, which is doubtless the chief organ of memory. And what the variety of succeeding objects may do whilst awake, that much more the various and multi-form motion of the animal spirits may do whilst asleep. And let a man be never so suddenly awaked, the very concussion of the nerves (if by external violence) communicated to the brain may shatter, and confound and blot out, in that moment, all the impressions which the

* Bax^t, p. 138. † Ibid. p. 142.

thoughts had made before, and if awaked without any such foreign force, the sudden and hasty motion of the spirits to the external parts may work the like effect.*

§ 14, page 85. This objection is not rightly stated. It is not only possible, but easy to forget on being awakened, what we were dreaming the minute before. And due care being taken, it is certainly also not impossible to observe it in many cases. A very remarkable author writing on this subject, saith, "I suppose the soul is never totally inactive. I never awaked since I had the use of my memory, but I found myself coming out of a dream. And I suppose they that think they dream not, think so because they forget their dreams."†

§ 16, page 87. If the soul were indebted to matter for the perfection of rational thinking, matter would be the more perfect being of the two. And if thinking, or activity does not belong to the nature of immaterial substance; it must be merely accidental to all substance, which is no less absurd.‡

Again, we have undoubted experience that the soul thinks and lives, while the senses are shut up and can minister nothing; and lastly, allowing all that is alledged, viz. that sometimes we sleep without dreaming, is it therefore to be inferred that sleep is an affection of the soul? Is it not conceivable to any man of common sense, that its activity may be quite hindered from being exerted, and its perceptivity entirely impeded, without supposing it to be laid up to be refitted, in sleep, as the body is, or making sleep an affection of a material being.§

In a dream, when it is certain that the soul is percipient and awake, it is yet not percipient of any external

* Baxt. p. 47.

† Mr. R. B. on the Soul's Immortality.

‡ Baxt. p. 143.

§ Ibid. p. 153.

touch upon the body : Why ? Because the action is really not communicated to it. Hence is manifest on which side the indisposition lies, and that sleep is not an affection of the whole man, soul as well as body, as Mr. Locke insinuates.*

§ 16, page 87. Here is a broad hint for material souls.—What is *for the most part only*, is not always, that side ought also to have been considered.† But the most incoherent of our dreams is an appearance far above matter, or any power matter can be endued with : and upon a narrow examination the actions properly of the soul in dreaming will not be found so irrational as is here presumed, and generally conceived.‡

This absurdity, (that the soul, &c.) is first made a consequence of what these men say, and immediately it is surmised that the quality of our dreams shews this absurdity to be fact.§ This is really a strange way of proceeding, to shuffle over the odiousness of an insinuation upon, and in case they should disown it, and that circumstance from which he would infer it (viz. that the soul thinks without being conscious of it) to endeavour to prove it, by an appearance, which is ready at hand. These men deny that the soul thinks less or more rationally, without being conscious of it, and therefore any consequence of such a position ; but who is it here that appeals to the frivolousness and irrationality of dreams to shew that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body. Mr. Locke should have told us what were his own sentiments of this affair ; and if it were an absurdity, shewn us how it was to be avoided ; but first to endeavour to turn it over to his as something very unjustifiable, which therefore shewed the absurdity of their opinion, and then to endeavour to prove it, was altogether singular. Here he supposes

* Bant. p. 155.

† Ibid. p. 174, 181.

‡ Ibid. p. 143.

§ Ibid. 270, 271.

that the soul itself produces all it hears and sees in sleep, that it thinks apart and separately at that time, and exerts the utmost perfection it is capable of, when destitute of the help of the body. How unjust and inaccurate a representation of this appearance is this.*

This observation of Mr. Locke is so far from being exact, that if he had made just the contrary observation, it would have been equally true, which is remarkable enough in a man of his accuracy and judgement. Besides, how could the soul upon Mr. Locke's own principles form to itself in sleep a scene of our waking actions and thoughts, and the man be still ignorant of it, without being two distinct persons?† If a lawyer answers the objections of the opposite party in his sleep, and if he made these objections against himself, should he not be as conscious that he made them, as that he made the answers to them? If objections are made, the efficiency of a rational intelligent cause is interested, from the nature of the instance: and if the person himself answers the objections, the soul reasons sometimes in sleep, or *both ideas under the conduct of the understanding*.‡

From our intimacy and acquaintance with this, vision, however new and strange to us, it is plain that the soul is capable of a more perfect and ready knowledge of things than that which it attains to now by the methods of sense and reflection.§

§ 24, page 91. The reflecting of the mind upon its own operations can signify nothing to the increase of knowledge, unless we be improved in our knowledge of those things on which we have thought. If the mind has not *innate* powers of carrying its thoughts further than the senses, it will be never the better furnished by reflecting or viewing what it has gained thereby: the

* Baxt. p. 270.

† Vide Lucret. 4, p. 960.

‡ Baxt. p. 276.

§ Ibid. p. 292.

operations themselves will not afford a new set of *ideas*, for they are only the *modes of thinking* so named; of which we have no ideas at all, when abstracted from the objects about which they are employed. And if this author means any thing more by *reflexion*, then it is the same which every body means by *knowing*, and it is very improper to reckon that to be a source of *knowledge*, which is *knowing itself*; and therefore he might as well have said in *Gassendus's* words, *nihil est intellectu, quod non prius fuit in sensu*. And therefore what he is pleased to call *natural* must be *acquired* (if all knowledge be) from our *senses* too. And if that be his meaning I conceive a *sensation*, an inadequate original of all knowledge, imperfect as it is, for these reasons:

1st, Because our external senses do, or can give no true account, or hear it, so much as of *corporeal* substances, or of any one of their *modes*.

2dly, Our *senses* must be infinitely defective as to *immaterial* substances; for into them the senses can give us no insight at all.

3dly, There are several general propositions as certainly true, as that our faculties are not deceived, yet we can come at no knowledge of them *merely* by our senses; because they cannot reach to all the particulars included in the subjects of them.

And lastly, There are some propositions as certainly true as that the sun is a luminous body; and yet the terms which constitute them, cannot be understood by the senses; as where the subject is a *negative*, *nihil nullæ sunt affectiones*, or nothing cannot produce an effect. No one will say he has an *idea* of nothing by his *senses*. Whatever *natural powers* therefore the mind has, neither they nor the exercise of them, can be derived from the sensation of external objects; but must come, by insensible ways, from the Author of nature in the constitution of our souls; and it is as rational to believe, that these *natural* powers are gradually imparted

to the soul according to its successive capacities to exercise them, as that the soul itself was at first *created* by the *infinitely-wise* Author.*

CHAP. II.

Of Simple IDEAS.

§ 1, page 93. *SOME of them are simple, &c.* But the better to understand this difference, he should have given some mark or definition of them, that so we might distinguish them from one another.† But we must be content with amplification instead of definition, which is a tedious, and I fear we shall not find a safer way to knowledge.‡

These qualities that affect our senses, when in the mind, are mere perceptions, and those perceptions have none of the features of the qualities themselves, as he himself expressly owns, and therefore cannot with any propriety be called *ideas*, much less *simple ideas*.§

As a man sees at once, &c. I question whether the sight can take in at once colour and motion distinctly; for though the succession in the acts of perception are very quick, yet, I doubt, that if there were not distinct instants, the perceptions of them could never be so; however this is certain they can never be perceived distinctly from that body in which they are, and so are *complex perceptions*, or *ideas*.||

A simple idea is one uniform idea, which cannot be divided or distinguished by the mind of man into two or more ideas.¶

§ 3, page 96. What our author says is *possible*, seems most *certain*, that *superior* intelligent beings have other

* Baxt. p. 43.

§ Lee, p. 48.

† Vide Watts Log. p. 33.

|| Ibid. p. 49.

‡ Lee, p. 48.

¶ Watts Log. p. 33.

organs for sensations than we have, and for memory than a *brain* such as we have; otherwise it would be *naturally* impossible, that angels and souls separated from their *present* bodies should have any memory of their *past* actions, or perceptions of *greater* pleasure or pain than we now have.*

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

§ 1, page 99. **T**HE word Solid is generally used in contradistinction to hollowness, signifying consistency, continuity, or mutual coherence of parts, and sometimes hardness; which is no positive but a relative quality to the constitution of our bodies, and therefore not so fit to be set up for the essential property of a body as extension, which of late has had the name of it.†

§ 3, page 100. *Space* distinct from *Body*:‡ for *space* seems to be the general name of what immediately affects our senses only with extension: *body*, the general name of what affects our senses with either figure, motion, or rest, besides extension.§

CHAP. V.

Of Simple IDEAS of divers Senses.

Page 104. **I**F there be any space beyond the confines of body, we cannot have so much as the *conception* of it, but only by the exercise of *reason*, inferring that there may be such *space*, because we cannot

* Watts Log. p. 49. † Ibid. p. 50.

‡ Vide c. 13, § 11, p. 152. § Lee, p. 71.

imagine or invent any *external* cause that should hinder the infinite extension of the universe, but that is not an idea, but a *rational* inference.*

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple IDEAS of Reflection.

§ 2, page 104. **H**OW *thinking* comes to be placed to *perception* only needs explication, for when we will love, hate, or desire, we *think*, as well as when we understand, imagine, or judge.†

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple IDEAS of both Sensation and Reflection.

§ 1, page 105. **B**UT what notion can a man have of *pleasure* or *pain* alone, I mean, without considering the *causes* of them, or *subjects* wherein they are? So that *pleasure* and *pain* seem only the names of our perceptions; *power*, *unity*, and *existence* the names only of the acts of the mind itself, exercised about things operating, existing, and being one, and not any abstract *ideas* or *objects* of the mind.‡

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Considerations concerning our Simple IDEAS.

§ 1, page 109. **T**HE cause of all perceptions is something *real* or *positive*; for in plain English, a *privative* cause, or the *privation* of a cause, is *no cause* at all.§

* Lee, p. 53.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid. p. 54.

§ Ibid.

§ 7, page 111, line 6. That so we may not think.— That the old philosophers thought so, appears from their giving the same name to the *quality* in the body, that excites a sensation in us, and to the sensation excited as, *Calor in igne, homo Calidus*.

When a thought is raised in our mind by the action of some real thing without us, this *idea* is the effect of a *positive* cause: but it often happens that a new thought shall arise from the want of a real thing, or when it ceases to act; here is a *privative* cause.

§ 8, page 111. Idea, what.—The *form* under which things appear to the mind or the result of our conception or apprehension, is called an *idea*.*

Which ideas. This use of the word *idea*, viz. for the quality producing it, will be apt to misguide any one that does not remember this admonition.†

Primary qualities are such as belong to bodies considered in themselves, whether there was any man to take notice of them or no.‡

§ 11, page 113. In the act of *imagination* indeed, when the object is not present, there is an *idea* of the *visible* object in the mind itself: but whether it be so, when the object is actually present, is not so evident; because we cannot easily distinguish between the impression which is properly the act of the *object*, and the perception which is the act of the *mind*.§ But this is certain, that there is at no time an idea or perception of any of those qualities *without* the subject in which they are, and so there can be no such things as *simple ideas*, they are all *compounded*.||

Secondary qualities are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on the account of various impressions which are made on the senses of men by them.¶

* Watts Log. p. 5.

† § 9, Ibid. p. 24.

‡ Ibid.

§ Watts Ess. p. 105.

|| Lee, p. 56.

¶ Watts Log. p. 24.

§ 15, page 114, line 5. *But the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities.* Because when the *ideas of the secondary qualities* are produced, there is nothing more in the bodies, than when the *ideas of the primary qualities* were produced: there is only a determinate set, or combination of the *primary qualities*; there are no new affections answering these new thoughts in our minds; and this seems to be a more proper way of speaking in this case: because there is indeed no resemblance between the *primary qualities* and our *ideas* of them, which are the modes of a different substance.

§ 19, page 116. The *superficies* of bodies do for the most part modify the light that falls upon them, and so their *colour* seems to be constant: but it is oftentimes modified before it comes at them, and they reflect it to our eyes with that modification, and then their colour is altered; and this new colour is as much their colour while they continue in that posture, as the other colour is at all other times.

CHAP. IX.

Of PERCEPTION.

§ 1, page 121. **P**ERCEPTION is the immediate self-consciousness of ideas in the mind, or of the natural relation of one or more ideas as existing in and appearing to the understanding.*

The word *perception* is seldom or never used for *thinking in general*; because thinking comprehends the acts of the *will*, as well as the *understanding*; and the *will* was never reckoned among the perceptive faculties, though it has great influence in the improvement of them.†

* Mor. Phil. p. 193.

† Ibid. p. 58.

Perception, conception, or apprehension is the mere simple contemplation of things offered to our mind, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them; the form under which these things appear to the mind, or the result of our conception, is called an *idea*.*

Perception is that act of the mind whereby it becomes conscious of any thing, when present.†

§ 8, page 123, line 8. *Of a flat circle variously shadowed.* Because the bottom of the eye being a *superficies*, nothing but a *superficies* can be there painted; and so all the solidity and thickness of bodies is lost: so those parts of a globe, which are directly opposite to the eye, and so on a parallel situation to it make the greatest image in it, and consequently the brightest and strongest colour; whereas those on either side, the further they go towards the tangent lines on the globe, the less images they make in the eye: as a circle, which was at first directly opposite and parallel to the eye by bending any way from it, makes at first the image of an *ellipsis*, and at last of a *line* only.

Where any body is more white, or otherwise enabled to reflect the light strongly, the nearer it will appear, and the less luminous the farther off: the reason is, because in the natural fabric of the eye, the nerves that are caused to move and thereby defend it against the more pressing light, contract so as it is, and must be, to see an object that is very near: so that there is no need of *experience* to teach us that *shade* stands for *figure*; for the parts from which the shade comes will, by the structure of the eye, appear further off than otherwise they would, and so the whole superficies of the globe appear protuberant, as it really is.‡

Page 124, line 22. *Or that a protuberant angle.—* The inequality of the angles which pressed his hand, is

* Watts Log. p. 5. † Ibid. p. 8. ‡ Ibid. p. 60.

image of the eye; a *cube* making nothing but a *parallelogram*.

Quere, Whether he would not by nature know the difference? or in other words, whether there be not constituted in nature a necessary connexion between a certain motion upon the organ of touch, and a certain perception, and a certain figure at the bottom of the eye, and the same perception.*

§ 9, page 125, line 8. *We bring ourselves to judge. Sc.* in the instance he hath given, that the thing we see is of an uniform colour, though the *idea* we have in our mind, when we see it, is of a thing *variously shadowed*. We bring ourselves to judge thus, by our having observed, that this *idea* hath been often produced in us by the convex figure of a globe of an *uniform colour*.

§ 14, page 127. The instance here given smells so strong of a certain principle that man is nothing but an organized body, with the knack of *thinking* tacked to it at certain times, that it may be enough to awaken any one that is concerned for the *immortality of human souls*, to see the dangerous consequence of it.†

CHAP. X.

Of RETENTION.

§ 2, page 128. *T*HERE is an ability in the mind, &c. From hence some infer *innate* principles, though there be not an actual perception of the several parts of those propositions, only a *natural* facility in the mind, to apprehend, connect, or disjoin them, when occasion offers the thoughts of them, just as there is a *power* in the loadstone to draw iron, before it ac-

* *Lec*, p. 60. † *Ibid*. p. 61.

tually exerts that power, and that is all they mean by *natural* or *innate*.*

§ 3, page 129. To these may be added *method*, by which things, that are a-kin to one another, may be so placed together in one consideration, as to make our thoughts easily succeed one another in train.†

§ 7, page 131. I am apt to think it is always *active*, i. e. that there is an *action* required in the mind, *distinct* from the *effect* which the impression left.‡ The act of the *memory* is as *distinct* from that which occasions it, as *sensation* itself, from the *motion* which comes from the object.§

Memory, as we are active in it, is the power itself belonging to the soul, whereby it applies the perceptive capacity to the consideration of any former object.

Memory, as we are passive in it, is only a thing being brought into the perception, with a secondary or concomitant perception, which distinguishes it from a new perception, and makes it appear only a perception renewed, or that it was there once at least before.||

§ 10, page 133. In this instance of birds, there is wanting something of convincing evidence that they are *conscious* of what they do. That the singing of some birds is in a great measure *mechanical*, is manifest from their singing more *briskly* in a room where there is most walking, talking, or any sort of *noisy* motion.¶

* Lee, p. 62.

† Ibid.

‡ Baxt. p. 289.

§ Lee, p. 63.

|| Baxt. p. 290.

¶ Lee, p. 63.

CHAP. XI.

Of DISCERNING, and other Operations of the Mind.

§ 3, page 136, line 17. *THAT* the same piece of sugar, &c. It is not true that the mind does at the same time perceive those two qualities in the sugar; it is at different times, as much as if they had been two different bodies, though they are in the same piece of sugar.*

§ 5, page 137, line 14. *Belonging to general ideas.*—There are really no general substances or modes, and consequently no ideas of general things; because there is nothing properly general but words or names, which are applied to several things. The reason is, because the mind observes those several things to agree to that which is the reason or foundation of that common or general name.†

§ 7, page 137, line 7. *Ever compound them, &c.* If they have the shape of their master in their eye, the sound of his voice in their ears, &c. one would think they can hardly avoid the having the image or idea of him in their brains, and that is a compound idea.

They appear not to miss them, &c. This has some appearance of an argument, that they do not either perceive or remember; for perceiving or remembering without distinction is not perceiving or remembering at all, or at least of no use.‡

§ 8, page 138. *Names are not always the signs of ideas.*§ The word *nothing* is the sign that our mind

* Lee, p. 65.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid. p. 66.

§ B. 3, c. 3, § 9. *Proced. of the Und. b. 2, c. 5.* King de Or. M. p. 7. *Watts Log. p. 1, c. 3, § 3.* Berkley concerning the *Princ. of Hum. Know. Introd. p. 6,* *Chamb. Dict. in Abstract,* and general.

conceives a thing as not *existing*, or of the *negation of existence*; but we have no *idea* of *nothing*, nor of that act of the mind by which we consider a thing as not existing.*

Whatever may be denied of abstract ideas, it is certain all true demonstration is in abstract ideas.†

§ 9, page 138, line 11. Abstraction is certainly a different act of the mind from sensation, whence reflection and abstracted ideas have their original; though perhaps sensation and reflection may furnish us with all the first objects and occasions whence these abstracted ideas are excited and derived. Nor in this sense and view of things can I think Mr. Locke himself would deny my representation of the original of abstract ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a distinct species.‡

The abstract natures of things consist solely in idea, and are not properly objects that can enter by material organs.§

§ 11, page 139. There is a gradation or scale of ascent of the principle of action among creatures, in proportion to their perfection. Brutes and men are spontaneous with regard to the motions of their bodies. But men have further a power of directing arbitrarily their perceptive capacity to and throughout their past perceptions, which brutes have not, (and therefore cannot be called thinking creatures.)||

And this is the specific difference betwixt rational and irrational beings, as this power is the foundation of the rational nature.¶

§ 13, page 140, line 16. Hence it comes to pass, &c. Hence it is plain that *ideas* are not the foundation of *certainty* or

* Lee, p. 66. † Baxt. N. p. 310. ‡ Watts Log. p. 32.

§ Watts Log. p. 91. Baxt. p. 84, p. 89, p. 134. Not. p. 86.

|| Baxt. p. 84. ¶ Ibid. p. Not. 79, 84, 107, 156. Brown on the Underst. p. 173.

true knowledge ; for if they are, how shall a *sober* man judge he himself is not *mad* ? for mad men's and sober men's *ideas* are equally *true ideas*.*

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex IDEAS.

§ 2, page 144. *A Complex Idea* is made by joining two or more *simple ideas* together ; but when several of these ideas of a *different kind* are joined together, which are wont to be considered as distinct single beings, this is called a *compound* or *collective idea*.†

§ 4, page 145. The word *mode* is generally used for any property, quality, affection of a substance, by which it is either distinguished from other substances or from itself.‡

A *mode* is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by the help of some substance, which for that reason is called its subject.

It is by some authors applied chiefly to the relations or relative manners of being : but in logical treatises it is often used in a larger sense, and extends to all attributes whatever, and includes the most essential and inward properties, as well as outward respects and relations, and reaches to actions themselves, as well as to manners of action.§

* Baxt. p. 68. † Watts Log. p. 33.

‡ Watts Log. p. 69. § Ibid. p. 16.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes ; and first, of the Simple Modes of Space.

§ 1, page 147, line 8. *MODIFICATIONS* of the same idea. The modifications of any thing are only the different *modi existendi*, or manners of existing belonging to that thing : that is, when a thing exists in different states or conditions, degrees or quantities, &c. these may be called different *modi existendi*, or *modifications* of a thing.

§ 5, page 148. *Figure*, in fewer words, is nothing but the determination of *space* or *body*.*

§ 12, page 153. The idea we have of space is of extension in the abstract, not of a concrete extended substance.†

The extension of body implies a particular action exerted, but the extension of space implies no such thing. Space has all the true marks of necessary extension, matter has all the contrary. To say, once space was not extended implies a contradiction : it is impassive, without figure, location, division, motion.‡

§ 16, page 154. This dilemma is avoidable only by owning *space* to be *substance* (though not *body*,) neither *material*, nor *cognitive*.§

* Watts Log. p. 71. † Baxt. p. 350. Watts Log. p. 13, 17.
 ‡ Baxt. p. 351. § Lee, p. 73. Cartes. Princ. Phil. p. 2, § 20.
 Newt. Princ. Math. Schol. Generale ad Fin. ejusdem Optic. Qu.
 20, p. 215. Dr. Clarke Dem. Prop. 2, his Letters to Leibnitz,
 p. 1, 11, 41, 55, 77, 101, 125, 181, 299, &c.—Ralphson de Spa.
 Reali. c. 5.—Jac. Ode. Princ. Nat. Philos. p. 22, 48.—Notes or Or.
 of Ev. Cudworth, Intell. Syst. 644, 766.—Green's Prin. Phil. b. 1,
 c. 4, § 8. 18.—Bayle Dict. p. 2790, 3083.—Colliber's Enquiry into
 the Being and Attrib. of God.—Gretton a priori, c. 6, 7.—Watts
 Philos. Ess. 1, p. 21.

§ 21, page 157. The controversy about a *vacuum* cannot be directly ended; unless it could be proved either, that there is no *space*, but where there is such a *body* in it as does produce some *sensible* effect: or that there is some *space*, where there is no *body* that can affect our *senses*; both which are equally impossible to be proved.*

Stretch his hand beyond his body? Yes; if there is *space* which is not *body*; but this is begging the question: otherwise, I answer, No; except there come so much *matter* from beyond the confines, as to fill that *space* which the hand left.†

§ 24, page 159. This is the best argument to prove a *vacuum*, viz. because we can so naturally conceive *space* distinct from *body*.‡

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration, and its Simple Modes.

§ 12, page 167. **T**HOUGHTS cannot be measured in length any more than they can be described by figures or colours; so that measuring duration by them seems like measuring pain by the inch or foot. And therefore we may have some notion of duration or time by our consciousness merely of the succession of our thoughts; yet they cannot come near the being a proper standard, or adequate measure of it.§

§ 18, page 169. Time is defined by Leibnitz, to be the order of succession of created beings.||

* Lee, p. 73. Baxt. p. 37. † Lee, p. 74.

‡ Lee, p. 75. § Ibid. p. 73.

|| Baxt. p. 375. Not. Ult.

§ 31, page 178. *External objects* cannot operate upon the mind any otherwise than by *present* impression, and therefore the knowledge or notion we have of *duration, time, and eternity*, is gained by the exercise of our *natural faculties* of imagining and reasoning, and not by *sensation* only.*

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expansion considered together.

§ 12, page 188. **T**O these two particulars, wherein space and duration differ, may be added a third, viz. that space is something real, and distinct from the mind conceiving it; but duration is only a mode of the mind's conception concerning the existence of itself, and other things.†

CHAP. XVI.

Of NUMBER.

§ 1, page 189. **N**UMBER, abstracted from the thing numbered, and from the names and figures by which it is expressed, is nothing but a thought or mode of conception, and is improperly called an *idea*.‡

CHAP. XVII.

Of INFINITY.

§ 6, page 197, line 16. **B**UT in other ideas it is not so.— These words seem to suppose that we can have an idea of the greatest whiteness that can be; but this we can no more have, than

* Lee, p. 81.

† Ibid. p. 84.

‡ Ibid. p. 89.

of the greatest degree of extension that can be. We may indeed suppose a thing so white, that, if adding a greater degree to it, will make a different *idea* in our fancy or imagination; but this he hath also observed of the addition of space and duration, when the *ideas* under consideration are very big or small.* But notwithstanding this, we add to any degrees of *whiteness*, still greater degrees of it, which, though less or equal will not, will increase it *in infinitum*, just as the increase is made in *extension*.

§ 7, page 198. Every idea is finite or limited, and therefore to say the idea of infinity is limited, is a flat contradiction; and to say that it is a continual growing idea, does not mend the matter. A person of sixteen years old is a growing person, but the number is not so, for that will be immutably the same; and the attributing that to the number which is a fixed limited mode of our conception, which is proper only to the thing numbered, creates all the confusion.†

§ 13, page 202. Though we have no complete and adequate idea of infinite, this does not prove that our notion or knowledge of infinity is not positive; for we may have a positive notion, or rationally grounded knowledge, of that which we do not comprehend.‡

§ 14, page 202, line 4. *He that considers that the end is body.*—This seems not a sufficient answer to the argument alledged; for though the end, *i. e.* the extreme parts of any thing be as much parts, and as positive beings as the middle parts, yet they may also be considered, as they are in this argument, *sc.* as the negation of further *extension*. But an answer may be fetched from the argument itself. For

* B. 2, c. 15, § 9, p. 148. † Lee, p. 89.

‡ Lee, p. 89. ---Not. on King. ---Cudw. Int. Syst. p. 647. ---Jac Ode Theol. Nat. p. 27. ---Ralphson Dem. de Deo, p. 2.

granting what was demanded in the argument, that the end of *space* is *nulla extensio ulterior*, an *infinite space* therefore is *quod non habet nullâ ulterioré extensionem*; now because we know not how much this *aliqua ulterior extensio* is, which, as he elsewhere expresses it, is a confused, incomprehensible remainder, we cannot have a clear, complete *positive idea* of *infinite space*. We have no *idea* of *infinite space* for this reason, when I have not the *idea* of all the parts of any thing, I have no perfect *idea* of the whole thing; and since *infinite space* is made up of infinite parts, *sc.* such parts as I can come to no end of, I have not a complete *idea* of *infinite space*; for if I had, I should have an *idea* of all the parts of it, and then the mind would come to an end of those parts which have no end at all; *which is absurd*.

§ 15, page 204, line 2. *This is plain negative, &c.*—What a *negative idea* is, or how part of an *idea* can be said to be *negative*, is to me unintelligible. I understand what a *negative proposition* is, as *a horse is not a stone*; but I have no *idea* of what is *not a stone*. But yet I have no *positive* reason to believe that proposition is very true. A *negative idea* therefore is very obscure, unlimited, or rather no *idea* at all.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the other Simple Modes.

Page 209. **O**F other simple modes.—It is not evident from the description here given, whether they be those he calls *simple modes*, or those he calls *mixed*; but they seem to be such *simple modes* as are variations of the same *simple idea*.

* Lee, p. 100.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

§ 1, page 212. *OF the Modes of thinking.*—The author now uses the word *mode* again in its usual sense, not that new one he hath made for it.

What this author calls the *modes of thinking* are only the several *operations* of the mind according to the *variety* of the objects, or the *manner* of its being employed about them.*

It is as absurd that the bare representation of things should be under the choice and conduct of the understanding, as it is that we should see what we please only when we look out of our window to the neighbouring fields. The soul reasons full as consistently as an unexperienced stranger would do about new and unknown objects.†

§ 4, page 214, line 11. *The mind fixes itself.*—It were to be wished that Mr. Locke had applied this to the possibility of matter's thinking.‡

§ 4, page 214. This is specious at first view, but is indeed a very equivocal argument, and concludes different ways according to the different acceptation of the word *essence*. He grants that thinking is action, and supposes *essence* to be the internal unknown constitution of things whereon their discoverable qualities depend. Now that thinking or action, which is a known property of the soul, should be the internal, unknown constitution of the soul is a contradiction, and, proving the contrary, is proving what was never denied. But this is not the genuine acceptation of the word *essence*. (*Vide infr. p. 44, § 6.*) From whence we

* Lee, p. 22.

‡ Baxt. p. 261.

† Ibid. p. 192.

may see the fallacy of Mr. Locke's argument. He makes essence the internal, unknown constitution of things; and because it is contradictory, that thought should be of the essence of the soul in this sense, he infers it is not of the essence of the soul in the other sense, i. e. so as to be inseparable from it; but that thought is essential to the soul, in the last sense, may be thus proved. It must be essential to one of the two substances, i. e. either to matter or spirit; otherwise the highest perfection in nature must be merely casual, or an extraneous accident in the universe, but it can neither be essential to matter, nor accidental. (*Vide infr.* p. 140.) Ergo, it must be essential to spirit, or such a property which cannot be separated from it without destroying its nature. Or if thinking is essential neither to body or soul, how come we at all to think? Is it by mere accident? If so, it is possible the soul should never think. If it be said the soul lays down and takes up thinking at pleasure, (by its own power, &c.) it is a direct contradiction. If the soul pleases to take up thinking after intermission, it must be previously thoughtful: if it be said to stand in need of some external principle to bring back thought to it, this is to own that it would never think again of itself, but be a dead inactive substance, unless restored by some external being. And the argument must come to this on Mr. Locke's hypothesis, if the soul were for any the least time without thought. The power of thinking in a substance once dead, cannot be conceived, because it is contradictory. Life itself consists in being percipient, in this we are necessary, and if we are percipient, we must have perceptions by the terms: thus it is very conceivable, that the soul should remit its activity in thinking through all degrees, till at length it can remit no farther, and finds itself necessary in having some perception or other.*

* Baxt. p. 153.

Thinking, (allowing it a variable property) may invariably belong to the soul: as figure is a variable property of matter, and yet invariably and inseparably belongs to matter; and as it is only the exercise of power, not the power itself, that is subject to the variation of being intended or remitted. This does not make the power itself separable from the soul. Again, Mr. Locke himself grants that *thinking* is the condition of being awake (*Sup. p. 72.*) a property then capable of being intended or remitted, necessarily belongs to the soul, at least for that time, and if we were always awake, would always and necessarily belong to it. And since we cannot cease being awake at pleasure, it is not in our power to become unactive at pleasure, or we are necessarily active. It is the indisposition of the body which occasions our not being always awake, that hinders our not always exercising the power of activity, allowing the soul sometime inactive.*

§ 4, page 214, line 17. *And last of all, &c.*—But this is only *experience* of having no memory of consciousness then, which does not infer that we had no consciousness then. When an evidence makes oath that his memory does not serve him so far, how much proves he by this? Nothing surely on either side. He only owns that the point in controversy might have been so, or otherwise, for any thing he can remember.†

Line 30. *Thinking is the action, &c.*—This opinion is not safe, nor the reason well-grounded. For when the mind ceases *thinking*, so far as we can conceive, it ceases to be any thing at all; and suppose the *essence* of any substance be taken for the *combination* of all the properties and qualities by which that thing is *distinguished* from another, then I cannot see, but that the *self-activity* of the *soul*, which includes both *thinking* and *motion* too, and which distinguishes it from *body*

* Baxt. p. 148.

† Ibid. p. 71.

and *space*, may not be capable of *degrees*, of being increased or diminished according to the various states and circumstances in which it shall be, for the exercise of that and other *natural* powers.*

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

§ 2, page 216. THESE definitions of *good* and *evil* are not *complete*: 1. Because they seem to confound *cause* and *effect*, for we call *effects* *good* as well as *causes*. 2. They do not keep up the just distinction between *moral* and *physical* good and evil: for if all be called deservedly *good* that procures *pleasure*, then there is no distinction between *real* and *apparent* good. There are some actions *good* or *evil* by an *immutable* constitution of the wise Author of Nature, and do not depend upon the *variable* opinions of men to make them *otherwise*, whatever they may call them.†

Pleasure and pain appear to be mere sensations, rather than proper ideas.‡

CHAP. XXI.

Of POWER.

§ 1, page 220, line 17. THAT *idea* we call *power*. —Power no way differs from that we call a *cause*, but that *power* relates to an *effect* *before*, and *cause* to an effect *after* it is actually produced. But neither power, cause, or effect, are *ideas*, purely the *names* we give those modes of conceptions which are formed in our minds, upon our observation of the mutual *relation* of substances, and their *operations* upon another §

* Lee, p. 94. † Ibid. p. 95. ‡ Watts Ed. 52, p. 81. § Lee, p. 95.

§ 8, page 224. *Liberty* is not a *power* to do or forbear any action, &c. nor indeed is it any *power* at all. It is only the defect, the absence or suspension at least of a *power* in any agent *distinct* from that which has the *power* of preferring or choosing; and so it only signifies the *extent* or *mode* of the mind's power we call the *will*, and not a *distinct* power itself from the *will*.*

The power of *willing* and *understanding* is proper sense, but the power of liberty or freedom is nonsense. What any one means therefore by liberty of will, is no more than this, that no agent, neither God, nor angels, nor any natural cause whatever, does irresistibly impel, or mechanically force his will to any good action, or restrain it from any evil; but that the only reason of his preferring a good action to an evil one is from himself.†

§ 8, page 224, line 13. Liberty consists not only in acting according to moral motives where they are; but in self-determination by the power of the will, where circumstances are indifferent; and that in the Deity himself.‡

§ 8, page 224, line 13. So that the idea of liberty.— This is nothing else but a *power* to execute the *determinations of the will*, and an exemption from external force for that purpose. So that this *liberty* doth not at all respect the *determinations of the will*, but supposes them to be over before it comes into play. But the general and most common notions of *liberty* concern the very *determinations of the will*, and the last result of our reason and judgement; and in the first it is required, whether the mind be *determined* to will by any *external* causes, and if it be, it is certainly not *free*. 2dly, Whether it be *determined* to will by the result of its own reason and judgement, so that it must necessarily will accord-

* Baxt. p. 97. † Ibid. p. 98. ‡ Ibid. p. 367.

ing to such result, and if it be so *determined*, some think it is *not* free, others that *it is*.*

§ 8, page 224. Mr. Locke takes a great deal of pains to prove that such liberty does not belong to the will; which is very certain, granting his sense of liberty to be the only one, since by his definition it is evidently subsequent to the choice or presence of mind, and only relates to the execution of such choice by an inferior faculty. But then, beside this idea of liberty, which is nothing to the present question, there is another previous and equally proper one, which regards the very determination, preference, or direction of the mind itself, and may be called its power of determining to do or forbear any particular action, or of preferring one to the other; and if freedom can with any propriety of speech be attributed to one of these powers, as he has constantly attributed it, why may it not, with equal propriety, be attributed to the other? ‡

§ 11, page 226. In all these cases, as the acts are not *voluntary*, are not *volitions*, so nobody pretends to liberty in them. But where there is *thought* or *volition*, there is *freedom* or *liberty*, and in no other case. *Freedom of mind* therefore is not its *power* to do or forbear according to its *volition* or preference, but *liberty* from the *impulse* and *restraint* of other causes distinct from itself. That is the true measure of freedom, where that *power* in other *agents* operates upon it, there it is a *necessary* agent, but where that power is wanting or suspended, there and there only it is *free* ‡

§ 23, page 233, line 15. *So that*.—If any one says, that when the mind either acts or forbears a thing proposed, it has a *power* at the same time to do neither,

* Vide Infr. § 8. ‡ Law on K. Notes, p. 245. ‡ Baxt. p. 100.

and therefore that proceeds from its own *free* determination, that it doth either of them at all; this *determination* must proceed from an *antecedent* will.

§ 25, page 234, line 4. *Whether a man be at liberty.*—This seems to be a quibble upon the word *pleases*, which had been avoided by saying *either of the two*; and the question being so worded would have been so far from carrying its *absurdity* so manifestly in it, that it would have been that great and famous one concerning the *freedom of man's will*.

But what does it signify to me that I must necessarily take one side, or the other, right or wrong, so long as I can chuse either of them indifferently? If I can chuse either of the two. Here is full room for the exercise of liberty, and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. Locke's next question; instead of which he slips in this absurd query, *Whether a man, &c.**

§ 29, page 236. Freedom may be justly predicated of the will, or of the mind in exercise of it; not indeed his kind of freedom, i. e. that of acting, which belongs to another faculty; but freedom, in our sense of the word, i. e. a certain physical indifference, or indeterminateness in its own exercise, which is what most men understand by lib. arbitrium. For if there be such a liberty in human nature, we have then got an absolutely self-moving principle, which does not want any thing out of itself to determine it, which has no physical connection with, and of no consequence no occasion for that grand determiner *anxiety*, &c.

To affirm that the mind or will is determined by the present satisfaction, uneasiness, &c. is saying, that it generally has some motives from without, according to which it determines the above-mentioned powers; though in reality it always can, and often does the con-

* Vide Bext. p. 90, 116, 119. Strutt's Remarks; p. 38.

trary, *vide* § 30, 46, 53, which no one in his right senses will dispute.*

§ 30, page 236. Mr. Locke seems to put the cause after the effect, as he sometimes makes anxiety concomitant, sometimes consequent; and § 31, he says the one is scarce distinguishable from the other. But this same desire appears to me to be the very determination of the will itself; what we absolutely desire we always will, and *v. v.* whether it be in our power to pursue that will, and produce it into act or not; and indeed desire seems no otherwise distinguishable from volition, than as the latter is generally attended with the power of action, which the former is considered without: this is all the distinction they are capable, which yet is only nominal; nor do his instances prove any real difference. In the 1st case, here are two opposite wills, or a weak imperfect volition conquered, by and giving way to a stronger, or rather here is but one actual will in the case, and the other is only hypothetical. 2. In this case I desire to bear the gout rather than a worse evil that may attend the removal of it. His axiom, therefore, is not true, that wherever there is pain there is a desire to be rid of it.

But, in reality, I believe Mr. Locke intends by *desire* what we mean by *will*, as in § 48 it is called the power of preferring, and puts volition into the place of action. § 16, 28, 30, c. 23, § 18, where he defines the will to be a power of putting body into motion by thought. The same notion runs through all his letters to Limborch.†

§ 31, page 237. Uneasiness can never determine the mind to will one action before another, where both are entirely equal; of which kind numberless occur in life.‡

* *Law on K. p.* 249, N. 45. † *Ibid. p.* 257. ‡ *Ibid. p.* 78.

This is but a scanty definition of *desire*; for a man may desire a thing which lies so much in his power to obtain, that it shall give him no *uneasiness* at all. The *uneasiness* men experience in that passion arises and falls as the difficulty, trouble, and hazard of the means of obtaining the thing desired increase or abate; and it may so happen, that the *delight* which the mind proposes to itself in the enjoyment, very often extinguishes all sense of that *uneasiness*; and then nothing is the *motive* to the will but the *proposed good*.*

§ 33, page 238. That *uneasiness* is not only the spring of ill actions, and most of the common actions of life, there is no doubt; but whether it be of *charity*, *piety*, *mercy*, &c. or other actions properly *praiseworthy*, which are the grounds and reasons of singular rewards, is much to be questioned. And,

2dly, If that principle be admitted to be the *motive* of the will, whether the minds of men would not be too much humbled, to have all their actions governed by the same principle than those of *brutes* are. And,

3dly, It becomes us to be cautious, that *human nature* be not by that principle debased to that degree as to come too to *mechanism*. For hunger and thirst, and such like natural *uneasinesses*, act upon our bodies, and consequently on our minds, almost as necessarily as weights upon clocks, to make them strike at their due times.

§ 36, page 241, line 10. *We cannot apprehend*.—These words seem to intimate that this is the effect of reasoning in us, which is not agreeable to experience; the account of this matter might therefore better be deduced from the *wisdom of God* in the contrivance of our nature; for since he designed us for *happiness*, he may

* Law on K. p. 104.

justly be conceived to make that *determinate* our wills, which removes what is contrary to that.

§ 44, page 247. The reason of men's not governing all their actions by the view of eternal happiness, and so in proportion to the true value of the good they aim at, may be as well accounted for from the want of a due consideration of the *nature* and *certainty* of that happiness, and the diverting, and more present pleasures they meet with, as from the sense of a present *uneasiness*. For as a due consideration of the *nature* and *certainty* of that happiness raises the mind to its just height of *desire* and *preference*; so the *uneasiness* that comes from the means only wears off and becomes no *motive* at all to *good* men.*

§ 47, page 249. This act of suspension must either be founded in the self-moving power of the mind, and consequently be naturally independent on all motives, reasons, &c. and an instance of the mind's absolute freedom from any external determination; which is a contradiction to Mr. Locke's general hypothesis: or else it must be determined, by some motive or external cause, and then it will be difficult to make it free in any sense.†

Page 249, line 12. *In this lies liberty*.—Were we in such a state of perfection that our *desires* always tended to our *happiness*, this would be a determination of *liberty*; but since in the condition we are we should oftener desire *wrong* than *right* (*sensual* pleasures being more apt to be suggested to our minds than *rational* ones) our being able to suspend the execution of our *desires* gives room for thought and reflexion; and the more our *desires* and *volitions* are the result of them, the more *free* we are; for those *actions* are most *free*, which

* Lee, p. 105.

† Law on K. p. 264, vide § 52.

are from a lively sense, and forcible conviction of the *goodness* of what we do, though we could not do otherwise, than those we have a cold indifference to.

§ 48, page 250, line 1. *This is so far from being a restraint.*—§ 50, page 251, line 30. *Such determinations abridge not.*—The author (as appears from the instances he presently gives) understands by *freedom*, an exemption from the force of external causes, which might hinder the execution of our *determination*, if we did determine; not an exemption from the force of our determination, when we make any; for according to these we must act when we do act. Now though it will not be granted him, that he hath secured the *freedom* of our minds, because his restraining the word *freedom* to the sense he uses it in will not be allowed, some understanding by it an indifferency after the utmost determinations of the mind; yet it is as easy to shew that a necessary compliance with these determinations is no *abridgement of freedom*; for since the freedom of an action consists in that lively sense and conviction of the goodness of it, and that ardor, and impetus, and tendency of the mind to it, with which it is performed; and since we always act with this disposition of mind when we act upon the *result* of our reasons and judgments: though we be necessitated always to act according to this *result*, we are nevertheless *free* in our actions; because they would still be performed with that disposition of mind in which *freedom* consisted; whereas, on the contrary, if we were perfectly indifferent after the utmost determinations of our minds, if the sense and conviction of the goodness of an action, the consequent ardour and tendency of the mind to it, did not always carry us to act, it is evident the external cause sometimes must do it; and we should be liable to be determined by them, which is a slavery and subjection to such causes. So that we see that a *necessary* compliance with the dictates of our *mind* is not only

consistent with freedom, but is the main preservative and security of it.

§ 48, page 250. Upon the supposition of our being inviolably determined in willing by our judgement, it would be really impossible for us to will amiss or immorally, let our judgements be ever so erroneous. The causes of which, (§ 64, page 262, line 4) *proceed from the weak and narrow constitution of our minds*, and are most of them out of our power; either therefore we can will without and against a present judgement, and therefore are not necessarily (i. e. physically) determined by it, or we cannot be guilty of a wrong volition, whatever proves the one by necessary consequence establishes the other. Farther, there are innumerable indifferent actions which occur daily, both with respect to absolute choosing and refusing, or to choosing among things absolutely equal, equal both in themselves and to the mind, on which we evidently pass no manner of judgement, and consequently cannot be said to follow its determination in them.*

§ 52, page 253, line 15. *Whatever necessity, &c.*—If this force which draws us towards happiness in general, be absolute and irresistible, as his words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and consequently prove as bad a ground for suspension as for liberty. But in truth this suspension is neither founded in any necessity of pursuing happiness in general, nor in itself an original power of the mind distinct from that of volition, but only one particular exercise or modification of it.

§ 58, page 258, line 7. *A man never chooses amiss.*—This expression is of the same nature with those that follow: *sc. we should undoubtedly never err in the choice*

* Law on K. p. 251.

of good, we should infallibly prefer the best.—The reason of them is this, because he supposes that when all *future* consequences of our actions were removed, those that had the most *present* happiness, would be really the best for us, would be for our *true good*.

Ibid. *He knows what best pleases.*—He would always chuse the greatest *present* good, if no *future* consequences attended his choice.

Ibid. line 8. *Things in their present enjoyment—The apparent and real good—The present good and evil.*—These expressions are all of the same nature, and import this much: That these things which are concluded with the *present* enjoyment, and have no *future* consequences, are truly and really so good as they seem to be; *sc.* as they are at *present*, and no better: they have just so much good as they bring along with them, and no more: whereas others, upon account of their future consequences, may be either better or worse, may really have either more or less *goodness* than they *seem* to have, *sc.* than they bring along with them at *present*. Such, therefore, in the main, all circumstances taken in, may be different from what they seem, may have more or less *true* and *real* good, if their consequences be considered, than is *apparently present*.

Ibid. line 16. *Were the pains of honest industry.*—There is so great difference betwixt these two *pains*, that we should certainly chuse the former; as also betwixt the two *pleasures* mentioned, that we should certainly chuse the latter. These instances therefore are brought to prove the assertion above, *that we should chuse the greatest present good*, if no *future* consequences attended the choice.*

§ 59, page 259, line 7. *Our desires look beyond—and carry the mind—according to the necessity.*—*Sc.* never but

* Vide Mor. Phil. p. 195.

when we think that absent good necessary to our happiness, and that is not often.

§ 63, page 262, line 49. *For that lies not in comparing.*—For here it is supposed there is none to compare.

Ibid. line 51. *But in another sort of wrong judgement, which is.*—Concerning things considered, as they may prove good or evil to us hereafter: this sort of *wrong judgement* is described § 66, page 264, and it differs in this from the former, that, in that, *present and future pleasure or pain* were considered simply in themselves, *abstracted* from the things which procured them; but this begins with the *things* themselves, and considers whether they will procure any *future good or evil*, and how much.

§ 68, page 265, line 18. *And very often in the means to it.*—When we have hit upon some means that we like, we take up with them, and think not any other necessary, though perhaps they are.

Ibid. line 27. *That they do not easily.*—If these be meant of the mistake of the means, the sense is, that we more easily take up with the means we have lighted upon, when others seem unpleasant. For this will conduce to make us think them unnecessary; if they be understood of the mistake of the end, the meaning is, that we can hardly think that any part of our happiness which cannot be obtained but by making us unhappy.*

§ 69, page 266. It is objected by Leibnitz, That if the mind could create pleasure by an arbitrary determination and bare election, it might, for the same reason produce happiness in infinitum. But it is surely no good consequence to infer, that because I can will a thing absolutely and freely, therefore I can will it in

* Vide Law on K. p. 333.

infinitum? May I not as justly be said to understand a thing in infinitum, because I perceive or understand it at all?*

§ 71, page 270, line 38. *I wish they, &c.*—It is antecedent to and independent on any particular thought or judgement, and continues equally independent after them. It remains in the same state after the determination of the judgement, as that Mr. Locke supposes of the operative powers of the determination of the will.†

This indifference of the operative powers is what can never constitute morality, since their operations are no farther moral than as they are consequent upon, and under the direction of the will.

There must then be another indifference prior to them, in order to make the exertion of them free in any tolerable sense.‡

§ 73, page 273. To these might be added position or distance; for it is manifest, that as the same body is in different postures and distances, it may produce differing perceptions, as of colours, magnitude, figure, &c.

CH A P. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

§ 2, page 275, line 29. *SEVERAL of those complex ideas.*—Some actions, for instance, enjoined by law must have been in the law-giver's mind before they actually existed amongst men, because they were performed pursuant to the law, and in obedience to it.

§ 5, page 277, line 7. *He shall find the reason of it to be.*—Sc. it was done for the same reason and end that

* Law on K. Note, p. 50.

† Ibid. p. 49.

‡ Vide Sup.

language was instituted for. This collection of ideas and language had both the same end and reason.

§ 10, page 280. Some men think *number* has been as much *modified*, or at least as capable of being so, and having distinct names too as *motion* or *thinking*. But as for *power* they never saw any *modifications* of that but only of the several *qualities* or *properties* which give that name to substances.*

§ 11, page 281, line 22. *And therefore many words.* —He seems to suppose that creation and freezing are actions of a different kind from either thinking or motion, and consequently as we have no idea of. But why may not creation be conceived to be a thought in the divine mind, and volition of God, upon which the existence of things is necessarily consequent? As for freezing, it is only the stopping or diminishing the agitation of the parts of water, which is a *modification* of motion.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

§ 2, page 283. **T**HE name of *substance* we give to any thing whose existence we conceive *independent* upon every thing else, and in which several properties or qualities are united or combined. And the *nature* and *essence* of every particular thing can be that only by which it is *distinguished* from every thing else; the *nature* or *essence* of every *substance* as distinguishable from every *quality* is, that its manner of *existence* is *independent*, and that it has several qualities *united* in it; and the *nature* and *essence* of every *quality*, as distinguishable from every *substance*, is, that its *manner*

* Lee, p. 109.

of existence is dependent, and that it has no *qualities* united in it. And in this sense we have as clear a notion of *substance* in general, or of any *particular substance*, as we have of *quality* in general, or any *particular quality*. And therefore it is not fair, first to require us to abstract every *property* and *quality* which constitutes the *essence* or *nature* of it, and then ask us, *What it is?* there being no such *substance* in the whole world.*

§ 5, page 290, line 14. *The one being supposed—and the other supposed—whatever therefore be the secret.*—The author by these expressions declares, that there is something to be considered in things besides the *collections* and *combinations* of their *qualities*, something that is the *cause* of their constant union and perpetual *co-existence*, which is the *substratum* and *support* of them, which notwithstanding is utterly unknown to us, and might give occasion to the old philosophers to say the *essences* of things were unknown; and this indeed seems necessary to be allowed; for otherwise, of *created substances*, for instance, it must be affirmed that God created only so many *collections* of *qualities*, which would be harsh and absurd to say.

That we have as good proof of its existence as we have for that of matter, I grant, but to say our ideas of their modes and properties are equally clear and distinct, appears to be a very groundless assertion.†

§ 9, page 295. *Primary properties* do not constitute *complex ideas*, because they are rarely known, for though we can by our senses discover, indeed, that in the general there are such *qualities* as *motion*, *figure*, &c. yet they go not towards making up the *ideas* of particular *bodies*, where we do not perceive them.‡

* Lee, p. 111.

† Brown's Answer to Christianity not Mystical, p. 35

‡ Lee, p. 112.

§ 17, 18. page 301. He has before ascribed motivity, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, to spirit, as one of the *ideas* peculiar to it; so that by mobility he seems to mean a capacity in spirit of being moved by something ab extra, and not the power of moving, which is included in motivity, especially since he makes mobility common to both matter and spirit, which, with submission, I think is wrong, and tends to confound the substances he would distinguish.—A substance that no way impedes motion, but effects it, can with no propriety, I think, have the capacity of mobility ascribed to it, as it is to body, a substance which resists motion, and no way effects it, and therefore wants an external mover. To make spirit material, and so at once both to cause and hinder motion, is a plain contradiction. Spirit, it is true, stops motion, but it is by the same living efficacy, by which it begins it; not by a deadness or resistance in itself to be moved. Besides, a spirit when it moves, hath no moment as body hath, proceeding from its vis inertiae. It cannot be said to resist, being brought from motion to rest, or v. v. since it effects these changes. If it moved circularly, it could have no centrifugal force. When a man walks his spirit moves his body, but is not moved by it. If both were moved, there would be no mover. Nay, in the journey betwixt London and Oxford, where the man's spirit is not the mover, but the horses move the coach, his body and all, his spirit does not impede the motion, or make the draught heavier, or is not properly amoved. So that in effect, mobility doth not belong in common both to body and spirit. Nor, farther, can motion belong to both, but in very different senses.

§ 19, page 301, line 3. *For having, &c.*—It is true spirits change place, and motion, in this sense, is competent to all finite spirits. But in this motion they are not moved but movers; which is the distinction endeavoured to be confounded. Sceptical people conclude

from this, that whatever moves is material ; but it will not follow that whatever moves as a mover is material, and has the relation of matter. For in the idea of the motion of body, a moved, and not a mover, is implied ; and the affections of movement, resistance, and tendency to move in the same uniform direction, are necessarily included. Were there but one body in the universe, these affections would inseparably attend its motion : and yet then the relation of distance would never shew motion. The distinction of *ubi* and *loco*, which Mr. Locke observes § 21, page 302, to be of little use to our conception, was introduced probably to signify that body and spirit occupy space after a different manner, though we cannot conceive that difference of manner.*

§ 23, page 303, line 6. *If he says, he knows not what he thinks.*—The author seems to confound *cohesion* of parts with *extension*, which are very different *ideas*, and may be distinct and separate in the mind ; for we may conceive the parts of matter *unam extra aliam*, one being not in the place where the other is, without any *idea* of *cohesion*, i. e. mutually touching one another at present, but indifferent as to their continuing so, or being separated ; we may have therefore a clear *idea* of the *extension* of the parts of matter without any *idea* of their *cohesion*, much more without considering the *cause* of their *cohesion*. (The best modern philosophers affirm it to be done by the constant *action* of some immaterial being, and most probably of God himself, who being every where is the most able to effect in this in every part of the universe) which is indeed an insupportable difficulty, but comes not in very properly or very pertinently in this place. The truth of this matter is, that there seems not to be any *difficulty* or *obscurity* at all in either of the *ideas* of *extension* and *thinking*, and it is very improper to inquire into the *manner* or *modes* of them,

* Baxt. p. 48.

which is not different from the things themselves ; for as we have a clear *conception* of *extension*, when we reflect upon the matter being in different places, and no two of them in one and the same ; so we have of *thinking*, by reflecting upon the operations of the mind, and to seek any further for the manner, is to seek we know not what.

§ 37, page 312. All ideas or notions of *substances* seem to enter into the mind *complicated*, and not *single*, and after they are there, are considered *abstractedly*, and compared, in order to *general* knowledge.*

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

§ 2, page 314, line 3. *AND* uniting severally.—These words are but an explication of power of *composition*, and must not be so read or connected with the former as to imply that *collective ideas* of substances can be made by *uniting substances*, which are all *complex ideas*.

In the forming conceptions of single substances, the mind considers those properties and qualities united, as it finds them united, and then by its abstracting power on occasion considers them separated. But in these collective notions the mind compounds the substances, or considers them united, which were in nature separated : The first is called analytical, the other synthetical method by old logicians.†

* Lee, p. 116.

† Ibid.

CHAP. XXV.

Of RELATION.

§ 8, page 319, line 28. *AND* those being all either.—
 Sc. all *ideas* in general are *simple* or *complex*: not that the *ideas* of *relation* here treated of can ever be *simple ones*, for he hath before made them a species of *complex ones*.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

§ 1, page 321. *CAUSE* and *effect* are only the names of *substances* given them for *active* or *passive* qualities in one or the other. The *final* cause, being only in *intelligent* agents, cannot be any thing more than *modally* distinct from the *efficient* (as *action* from *agent*). The *material* cause, being only in *corporeal* substances, cannot be any thing distinct from the *effect*; nor the *formal* from the *efficient effect*, being the combination of those properties or qualities in the *active* substance to operate, or the *passive* substance to receive any new modification. For instance, in a watch, the conveniencies of knowing the hour, &c. designed by an artist is the *final* cause; the brass, silver, &c. is the *material* cause; the powers and qualities exercised by the artist denominate him the *efficient*; and the new modification superinduced in the materials, when fitly put together, are its *formal* cause.*

* Lee, p. 118.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diversity.

§ 3, page 327. **M**ERE *existence* is not the *Principium Individuationis*. To judge whether a thing be the *same* with itself at different times, a man must have some conception of what that is at one time, that he may compare it with itself at another: but that he cannot possibly have, that has no *object* for his thoughts, but bare *existence*. The *Prin. Ind.* therefore in any body is its figure, position, bulk, motion, or rest of all its particles, and not its bare existence. The supposition here made of an *immutable* atom is not only impossible, but supposes that every thing it was to prove, for if it be *immutable*, it must be the *same*, without all question.

What is the *Principium Ind.*? Or what is it that makes any one thing the same as it was some time before? This is too large and laborious an inquiry to dwell upon here, yet I cannot forbear mentioning this hint, viz. since our own bodies must rise at the last day, &c. there may be perhaps some *original fibres* of each human body, some *stamina vitæ* or *primæval* seeds of life, which may have remained unchanged through all the stages of life, death, and the grave; these may become the springs and principles of a resurrection and sufficient to denominate it the *same body*. But if there be any such constant and vital atoms which distinguish every human body, they are known to God only.*

§ 4, page 328. The *continual successive*, though *insensible*, apposition and union of new particles of the same contexture and configuration, helped by the *solar* and *central* heat, is sufficient for plants being called the *same*,

* Watts Log. p. 111.

young and old, without a *common principle* of life, as well as it does of *minerals*.

§ 5, page 328. The supposition is here again impossible; for though the comparing *animals* to *machines* be a good similitude, as that of silly men to asses, yet it is no proof of its possibility. *Animal*, therefore, may more properly be said to be the *same* by having its parts *united* to the *same* inward *principle* or cause of life.*

§ 6, page 329, line 3. *Nothing but a participation.*— This participation of the same continued life may be called the *animal identity*, but it is not in this alone that the *identity of man* consists, but in this and the *identity* of the soul joined together: so that if either of these two *identities* be wanting, the *identity of man* is lost; ex. gr. If the *same* soul should successively inform those we call the *bodies* of *Seth*, *Ismael*, &c. they would all be the same man, for want of the animal identity; and if those we call the souls of *Seth*, *Ismael*, &c. should successively inform any one body, they would not be the *same* man for want of the *identity* of the soul.

The *identity* of man consists something more than matter organized in the same manner, in the same principle of *intellectual* actions, or in the same individual spirit united to the *same* body, however the several parts of that body may have insensibly *changed* in the several successive moments and states of life. And this we find certain in matter of fact; but we never yet heard of one soul being united to two complete bodies of human shape. The supposition therefore of its *possibility* must be looked upon as fictitious and very unphilosophical. Since God has neither given us any evidence to believe it is so, by what he has done, nor revealed to us he ever will; and we have no measure of possibility but that.†

* Watts Log. p. 122.

† Lee, p. 124.

§ 8, page 330. Inferences grounded on such suppositions as these of the cat and parrot, are mere romance.*

§ 9, page 333, line 20. *And as far as this consciousness.*—The meaning of this, and some following expressions of this nature, is not *that personal identity* that reaches no further than the *memory* of our past actions: for we may have perfectly forgot some of them, which yet certainly were the *actions* of our *very selves*. That which is here asserted therefore is, that supposing any past *actions* return to our minds, either by the power of *remembrance*, or external suggestion, if we have the same *consciousness* of them that we had of them at *first*, and which we have of *present* actions, we are the *same* persons that did them, and not otherwise.

§ 10, page 333. Consciousness is only the repeated and successive acts of the mind, by which it takes notice of its former and successive actions; but actions cannot unite themselves, and therefore that which must make these distinct and successive acts of consciousness to be the actions of one being, must be something distinct from the actions themselves, and that must and can be only the mind itself. Ergo, it is that and not consciousness that denominates the person the same with himself at different times.†

Page 334, line 27. *Different substances.*—The author's method seems not to be good here; for in this place he takes that for granted, which a little lower in these words, "*Or can be continued in a succession,*" he speaks doubtfully of, and § 12, page 335, debates as a question.

Ibid. line 29. *As different bodies, by the same life.*—Sc. *Different particles* of matter falling as fast as they come, into the disposition, or organization that some

* Lee, p. 124. † *Ibid.* p. 125.

one original mass had, are still esteemed the *same* vegetable or animal body.

Ibid. line 36. For as far as any intelligent being.—He seems to suppose there may be an intelligent being (meaning, I believe, his person) subsisting of itself, independent of all thinking substances, which one after another may be joined to it; a strange thought.*

Ibid. line 48. The same consciousness uniting.—He supposes two substances, one which hath the same consciousness of the other's past actions that it hath of its own present ones, to be the same person.

§ 11, page 335, line 7. *Are a part of ourselves, &c.*—and substance whereof personal self consisted.—The author seems to have forgot his definitions of person § 9, page 333, a *thinking intelligent being*, of which certainly matter cannot be a part, and indeed this is not at all a fit instance, nor does it come up to the matter in hand, though he uses it several times afterwards.

The limb, whilst it is vitally united to the body, was no more a part of our *conscious selves*, than our blood is. No part, nor indeed the whole body, is any more than the soul's instruments in its operations, does not think, is not conscious of any of its actions. The eye does not see, nor the ear hear, &c.—This then seems rather an argument to prove, that *animus cujusq. est is quisq.* because the man is the same after the limb is cut off, then the contrary.†

§ 12, page 335, line 1. *And to this I answer.*—This paragraph seems very obscure, and confused, and little or nothing to the purpose.

Ibid. line 6. It is plain.—They seem to make it the same with *animal identity*.

Ibid. line 10. Before they can come to deal with these men.—For these men making *animal* and *personal*

* Vide § 25. † Lec, p. 128.

identity the same, will demand first of all, as previous and preparatory to all further disputes, why those that allow *animal identity* to be preserved in the *change of substances*, will not grant that *personal identity* may also be so preserved: and this the other side must resolve before they enter into any further debates, unless they will deny *animal identity* to be preserved in the change of material *substances*; sc. unless they will, it is one immaterial spirit in brutes, that makes in them the same life.

§ 12, page 335. To the two parts of this question may be given these two plain answers: to the first, that if the *thinking substance*, the principle of intellectual operations, be changed, it cannot be the same person. To the second, that if it be not changed, it is the same person.

Ibid. page 335. *A purely material, animal constitution.*—If the fleeting animal spirits be the *soul*, the intelligent being, there will be as many persons as there are distinct animal spirits, or particles of *refined matter*; for they never make each other conscious of their several motions and actions.

Ibid. page 335. *As well as animal identity.*—But not so much as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, except that change be *gradual*, and insensibly successive in the course of nature.*

§ 13, page 336. *That cannot be resolved, &c.*—The two conditions here proposed, are somewhat unreasonable: for 1st, I presume nobody knows what kind of substances those are which *think*; because, if *thinking* of all sort be abstracted, there remains nothing in an intelligent being which we can conceive, and because there is no such sort of substance in the world. 2dly, If *consciousness* be only a power, or repeated acts of *knowing*, I ask, whether it can be conceived without a *substance* or something, call it soul or body, wherein that power

* See, p. 125.

is, or of which that *consciousness* is the successive and repeated *action*? 2. Whether men can be *conscious* of that which they never did, or judge they did that of which they never thought of doing? And 3, Whether *thought* can be imagined without a *substance*, any more than *motion* or *figure* without a body *moving* or *figured*? And if it be so, which seems to be the sense of all the world, then *consciousness* neither can constitute the *person*, nor can be *transferred* from one soul to another, any more than one man's pain in his head or foot can be *transferred* to another's.*

Ibid. line 16. *Will be hard*.—To make this sense run clear these words must be read together: *till we know what kind of action it is, and how performed in thinking substances*; and the intermediate ones left out.

Ibid. page 16. *What kind of action*.—Sc. What kind of action this representation of things to our mind as done by us, which never were really done, is.

Ibid. page 17. *That cannot be done, &c.*—This sentence, and that which follows, *Who cannot, &c.* are put in to shew that if there be such a representation of things to our minds, as is mentioned above, there must be also a *consciousness* of them.

Ibid. line 20. *The same consciousness*.—Sc. not being meant of the individual *consciousness*, for that no one substance can have at different times, but a *consciousness* of the same sort or kind.

Ibid. line 26. *As well as several representations in dreams*.—It is true, a man may be deceived at present in a dream, but I never heard that any man ever dreamed, that he did that which at the same time he thought another person did, or that he thought, i. e. was *conscious* of that which he did not think he did, and so he was not deceived in the *consciousness* of the reflex act.

* Lee, p. 126.

Ibid. line 35. *How far this.*—He intimates that if thinking be placed in such a system, the *consciousness* of past actions may be transferred from one *thinking* substance to another. (For *animal and personal identity* being then the *same*, preserved in a change of *material* substance, if any one person be the *same* with himself at different times, different substances must be *conscious* of the *same* actions as done by themselves.) And he leaves it to be considered therefore how far the *goodness of God* may be an *argument* against such an *hypothesis* of *thinking*.

§ 14, page 337, line 2. *Whether the same.*—Whether the *same immaterial being* which alone is *conscious* of the actions of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all such *consciousness*.

Ibid. line 18. *Not having continued.*—Or inactivity, but having been conscious of something or other in every one of those ages.

Ibid. But till he have some of that *consciousness*, which it is impossible to have, it is as impossible for one soul to be in several bodies in different ages, as for two persons, who co-exist, to feel each other's pains or pleasures.*

§ 15, page 338. But if there was not the *same soul*, the *same principle* of intellectual operations, though possibly there might be a new *creation*, there could be no resurrection. It is better therefore to content ourselves with the assurance of a *resurrection*, from reason and revelation, than please ourselves with an *imaginary* and *miraculous* creation.†

§ 18, page 340, line 16. *Or could own.*—Nor could the finger own any of the actions of the body after the

* Lee, p. 128. † *Ibid.* p. 129.

separation;

separation; for he now supposes it to act after the separation, because it has life.

Ibid. There is no manner of doubt, but that every distinct soul shall in the future state be made conscious of its good or ill actions, but the grand question is, Whether this be possible, if the soul was annihilated? It is an idle thing to hope for that which almighty wisdom has given us no sort of evidence, that it is so much as possible, any more than he has, that all the soul, all its sensations, and other operations, can be epitomized in a finger.*

§ 21, page 342, line 2. *Cannot be the same man.*—Yes; by the *same* soul being united to *those* particles of matter, which composed his body, when he died, put again into the same organization or *animal life* at the resurrection: and though some *new* particles should be taken in also to complete the work, yet so long as the old ones were the rudiments, and foundations of it, this would not destroy *animal identity* according to his own principles.

§ 25, page 344, line 40. *Any substance vitally united.*—Sc. any substance whatever in any nature.—But this is a strange expression, which seems to imply that when any one spirit is no longer a *man's self*, by being stript of its *consciousness*, there still remains a *present thinking being*, to which a *new spirit may be vitally united*. And indeed the author has been forced to use some harsh and uncouth ways of speaking, by reason of the strangeness of his notion, in which he seems after all to be mistaken; for it is much more agreeable to reason that *thinking substance and person* should be *one* and the *same* thing. It is an extravagant fancy to imagine that *one spirit* should become *conscious* of the actions of *another*, as if they were its own, and so they *two* be *one*

* Lee, p. 128.

person. Nor is the other supposal much better, that any one spirit by losing the *consciousness* of all his *past* actions, and getting the *consciousness* of *new* ones, should thereby become *two* persons. It would not indeed be concerned, as he says, in those actions which he had lost all *consciousness* of; he would not attribute them to *himself*, or think them his *own*; but he would still be the *person*, that did them. What the author asserts, that *such a spirit would not be accountable*; *sc.* rewardable or punishable for such actions seems justly questionable; he himself hath given an instance to the contrary among men. And though perhaps it may seem most probable and agreeable to the divine justice and wisdom, that should men be *conscious* of what they are rewarded or punished for by him; yet this is by no means certain, at least, as to all *particular* good and bad actions. And I suppose our author himself would scruple to allow that an *intellectual substance*, which according to his own supposition § 13, page 336, had got a *consciousness* of all other actions, should be *rewardable* or *punishable* for them.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Other RELATIONS.

§ 10, page 372. *VIRTUE* and *vice* are not mere *arbitrary* names, but resolvable into *immutable* relations, i. e. are as *immutable* as the surest maxims of *truth* and *falsehood*.*

§ 11, page 373. Nothing more is intended by these expressions, but that virtue was so agreeable to the natural sense of mankind that they reckoned praise the general reward of it, not *virtue* itself. Cic. Tusc. l. 4. *Virtus est affectio animi constans conveniensque laudabiles efficiens eos in quibus est, separata etiam utilitate laudabiles.*

* Lee, p. 133.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused Ideas.

§ 2, page 383, line 11. *OUR simple ideas are clear.*—He means that then they are *clear*, when they are such that nature designed we should have.

Ibid. line 23. *And the number and order.*—For if there are complex ideas, which are continually varying as to their number, and order of their ingredients, they can never be *clear* in the sense above-mentioned.

§ 4, page 384, line 1. *As a clear idea is that.*—The perception the mind hath of *clear ideas* is all it can, or is to have, and is a vigorous, lively perception:

§ 5, page 384, line 9. *No idea therefore.*—Every *idea* considered in itself as in the mind is distinguishable from all others (different perceptions making it so) and is only a *confused idea* of the things the names it is expressed by stand for. Thus the *idea* of a spotted beast considered in itself is distinct from that of a beast without spots, and from all other *ideas* in the mind, and is only a *confused idea* of those beasts expressed by the names *leopard, lynx, panther*.

§ 8, page 386, line 12. *This draught.*—These surprising pieces of art are said to have been invented, or much improved by one Mr. *Matthews*, Fellow of *S. I. ney College, Cambridge*.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

§ 4, page 395. **B**UT most men think they could have no notions of any *moral virtues or vices* without deriving them from *real* actions either in their own minds, or from the sensible actions of others; and as every man's notions agree, more or less, with that which is founded in nature, so they are more or less perfect, but not more or less *real*. And no ideas seem to be *archetypes* or *originals*: they are all, when in the mind, types or copies derived from *real* actions in nature; else *virtue and vice* would be arbitrary notions, made according to every man's pleasure and fancy.*

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

§ 2, page 397, line 1. **S**IMPLE ideas are *inadequate* as well as *complex*: 1. Because there is no *natural* connexion between those *qualities*, when considered in the *object*, and the *effect* of them, when considered as in the *mind*; the *effect* is widely different and *incommensurate* by the cause. 2. Because we have more knowledge of all the sorts of *single qualities or modes* of *particular substances*, than we could derive from the things considered in themselves: so vastly do the effects exceed their *original simple causes*.

§ 6, page 400. The word *essence* is generally used for that only by which a thing is *distinguished* from every thing else, and in this sense we may have as *adequate idea* of any *substance* as of any *quality* in it.†

* Lee, p. 136.

† Ibid. p. 138.

Ibid. line 3. *Now those ideas.*—In order to understand the author's sense of this matter we must recollect from what has gone before, what *ideas* we have of *substances*, and how far they answer their *archetypes*.

1. Therefore to begin with the general division of *substance*, of *matter* and *spirit*, which are all the sorts of it we know of. The *idea* we have in general of *matter* is an *idea* of *solidity*, *extension*, *figure*, &c. with an *unknown substratum*, support, or cause of union of these qualities. The *idea* we have of *spirit* in general is an *idea* of consciousness or *thinking* in general with an *unknown substratum* or support also. This *substratum* or *cause of union* is the same thing which the men he here hath to do with, call *real essence*, *specific essence*, or *internal constitution*, &c. from which all the qualities flow, upon which they depend, and with which they have a necessary connexion.

2. The *idea* we have of particular material substances, sc. inanimate, vegetable, animal bodies, consists, 1st, Of all that was in the former idea, because they are so many parcels of matter. 2dly, Of the supposition of a division into minute parts, and of a particular bulk, figure, and motion of those parts, which are called the *primary qualities* of bodies; which, though they must needs be supposed, or else all parcels of matter would be alike, are as unknown to us as the *substratum* above. 3dly, Of active and passive powers discoverable by our senses, which are called secondary qualities, because they result from the primary ones, and are indeed all that we think, have ideas of, or conceive in them. So likewise our *idea* of particular *immaterial* substances, sc. *God*, *angels*, *human souls*, consists of the *idea* abovementioned, and the supposition of any particular *modes* of *thinking* unknown to us, and the active and passive *powers* we know in them.

Of any of these particular *material* substances (for of these alone the author treats) sc. *gold*, it may be said, that its *primary qualities* (sc. the particular *bulk*, *figure*,

motion, &c. of its parts) are its *real essence*; they are that which distinguish it from all other matter in the world, and from whence all its active and passive powers, discoverable by our senses, flow.

From hence it is evident; 1st, In our idea of any particular *material substance*, sc. *gold*: the substratum of its solidity and extension, as it is matter; its *primary qualities*, or real essence, as it is gold: and many of its active and passive powers, or *secondary qualities* being unknown; no such *idea* can be *adequate*; for so much as is unknown, it cannot include, represent, or answer to; so much it wants of perfection, and so much it is different from its *archetype*.

2dly, That those, whose *idea* of gold is only referred to, solely respects, and is absolutely terminated upon the *real essence* of gold, which is unknown to them; sc. those who when they think of gold, endeavour to think of nothing but the *real essence* of it: these men, I say, are so far from having an *adequate idea* of gold, that they have no manner of idea of it, nor indeed any idea at all: for since of that which is unknown in things we can have no idea, we can never think of any thing if we do not know it. And since their idea of *gold* extends to *nothing* but what is unknown; it is plain there is nothing of that which is in gold in this *idea*; there is correspondency betwixt the type, and its pretended *archetype*, no likeness, no resemblance. It is no more the idea of gold than of any other thing; and indeed it is the *idea* of nothing; sc. no *idea*, but a delusion of the mind, thinking it has an idea when it has none.

3dly, Those whose *idea* of *gold* is referred to *sensible qualities* of it only, or its active and passive powers discoverable by us; sc. those who when they think of *gold*, think of nothing but these: such men, I say, though they have something of that which is in gold in their idea, yet are far from having an adequate idea of it, for the reasons abovementioned.

Ibid.

Ibid. line 4. 1. Sometimes they are.—Sometimes when men think of substances they endeavour to think of nothing but a supposed real essence in them.

Ibid. Sometimes they are.—§ 8, page 403, Those who endeavour to copy substances.—Sometimes some men, when they think of substances, think of nothing but that collection of that active and passive powers they observe in them, and this is all the idea we have of them.

Ibid. line 12. It is usual.—He supposes that men generally give names to things only upon account of their specific essence; that their names solely respect them; so that they would not, for instance, call a parcel of matter, gold, did they not think it had a certain real essence, which runs through all the parcels of that sort; for its having such an essence is what they mean when they give it that name.

Ibid. line 24. And thus they.—Thus they give the name of gold, under which they rank all parcels of matter of that sort. They give it, I say, to those parcels only upon account of a *specific real essence*, which they are supposed to have, and to be distinguished by from all other parcels of matter.

Ibid. line 41. For then the properties.—He supposes the *complex idea* already made by a collection of those qualities we have hitherto discovered in a *substance*, and that afterwards we find some others, which might as well be put into the collection, but that they were found out too late: sc. after the *collection* was made.

Ibid. line 59. That men should.—That they should ascribe the distribution of things into sorts to the specific essences (one of which is supposed to run through every sort and distinguish it from all others) as the only cause of such a distribution.

§ 9, page 404, line 2. Could not rationally —For the real essence being but one, a fixed and certain thing:

whatever qualities depend upon that, must be fixed, certain, and immutable : so that every parcel of matter we call *gold*, must have the same bulk and figure, which we see is not so.

§ 12, page 405, line 15. *That simple idea.*—Thus when I have the idea of paper being white, I think of a power it hath to produce that sensation in me : and the paper hath really just such a power extending only to its effect, and no other : for if it extended to other effects also, it might produce a sense of other colours as well as whiteness ; which I see it doth not ; so that my idea corresponds, answers, is agreeable, adequate, and commensurate, to the power in the paper of which it is the *idea*.

§ 13, page 406, line 25. *A man has no idea.*—He means of unknown substratum, of extension and solidity in matter.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

§ 6, page 409, line 1. *THESE* suppositions.—Chiefly of *abstract complex ideas* ; and the reason is, that men being very much given to make these *abstract ideas* ; it is natural for them to suppose they are agreeable to things without them, for else they must think they had not made them right.

§ 9, page 410, line 8. *And every day's.*—Sc. by the frequent occasions he has to observe what names men give to each colour.

Ibid. line 13. *By the objects.*—In which he hath observed how men call them.

Ibid. line 15. *Or applies the name.*—Sc. judges that that *idea* he expresses by the name *red*, is the same *idea* which

which others express by that name, when it is not so, but is that which they express by the name *green*.

§ 12, page 411, line 14. In reference.—In reference to the ideas of other men, expressed by the same names, and looked upon as a standard.

§ 14, page 412, line 10. And thus answering.—This is coincident with *adequate ideas*, c. 30, § 2, page 394, and so each sensation answering the power; and with *real ideas*, c. 31, § 2, page 397, and thus our *simple ideas* are all *real* and *true*, because they *answer*, &c.

Ibid. line 13. If the mind.—So judges of them, it makes a false judgement, which is all the falseness there can be in *ideas*. Though indeed this false notion of them serves the uses of life as well as the true one.

§ 15, page 413, line 6. If the idea of a violet.—The supposition is that the *idea*, produced by a Violet in the mind of A, is the same that a Marigold produces in the mind of B, and consequently different from that which a Violet produces in the mind of B, and so in like manner, the *idea* produced by a Marigold in the mind of A, is the same that a Violet produces in the mind of B, and consequently different from that which a Marigold produces in the mind of B. Now though this would breed no confusion or inconvenience as to the uses of life, provided A called that *idea* which a Violet produced in him *blue*, as well as B, though it were different from B's *idea*; and that *idea* which the Marigold produced in him, *yellow*, as well as B, though different from B's *idea*. Yet, notwithstanding, if A should think his *idea* of *blue* and *yellow* were the same with B's *ideas* of those colours; this would be a false judgement of his *ideas*, which is all the *falseness* that can be in them.

§ 18, page 414, line 12. When they put together.—This and the following instance of false ideas are coincident with the fantastical ones, c. 30, § 2, page 397.

BOOK III. CHAP. I.

Of Words, or Language in General.

§ 5, page 428, line 12. *ARE* all words taken, &c.— This inference seems to be too general; for every man, whether there were any words or articulate sounds used or not, would understand his own thoughts; the using such words, therefore, to express insensible things, argues only the defect in language, but not our want of knowledge of such things, unless we could suppose such as are deaf and dumb have no thoughts or consciousness of the actions of their own minds; or that there is a natural connexion between the sounds and the thoughts themselves, both which are demonstrably false.*

Ibid. line 13. *Spirit in its primary*.—These words indeed seem to prove that *sensible ideas* were the first in the mind; for men would not have taken from them words to express their *ideas of immaterial substances*, had they not been known and familiar to the mind before such *ideas of immaterial substances*. But as for the metaphorical words he mentions, *adhere, conceive, insill*, they seem not to have been made by the first beginners of languages, but to have been brought in afterwards by poets, orators, rhetoricians, to please and gratify the fancies of men, and adorn and embellish discourse.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

§ 2, page 431, line 13. *NOR* can any one apply.— He may pronounce the word like a parrot without knowing what *idea* it stands

* Ch. 2, § 1.

for : but if he do apply it to any *idea* at all, it must be to one of his own *ideas*.

Ibid. line 15. *For this would be to make.*—This would be to be capable of doing a thing which would wholly destroy the use of language, and consequently be a reflection on the Author of nature for contriving it in such a manner.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

§ 9, page 439. **A**N *abstract idea* is nothing else but the representation or resemblance in the mind of a single or particular visible object, when the object itself is not *present* does not actually affect the eye.

There can be no *general* or *abstract ideas* in the author's sense, because no men can think of more than one thing at one instant, and therefore cannot form a *general* or *abstract idea*.*

§ 12, page 442, line 15. *Whereby it is evident.*—The series and force of this reasoning is this: *to be of any species* is the same as to have a right to the name of *that species*. To have right to the name of a *species* is to have a conformity to the *abstract idea* of that *species*; to have a conformity to the *abstract idea* of that *species* is to take all in that the *abstract idea* contains; *ergo*, to have the *essence* of a *species* is the same as to have all that the *abstract idea* of that *species* contains and no more; so that the *essence* of a *species*, and the *abstract idea* of it, are the same.

§ 12, page 444, line 4. *For the having the essence.*
—Having the *essence* of a *species*—being of that *species*

* Lee, p. 204.

—having a *right* to the *name* of that *species*—having a *conformity* to the *abstract idea* to which that name is annexed: *ergo*, having the *essence* of a *species*—having a *conformity* to the *abstract idea*.

Ibid. line 4. *That the essences of the sorts.*—In order to understand this expression, we may observe, 1st, that as the word *idea* often signifies in this author a *real quality* of a thing without us, as well as our thoughts and notion of that *quality*; so the term *abstract idea* may signify a collection of *real qualities* co-existing in a thing without us and common to it with other things, as well as our complete thought or notion of those *qualities*.

2^{dly}, That *essence* and *sort* or *species* in this expression may be referred either to our minds, or to things without us; if they are referred to our minds, the meaning of the expression is, that it is the *essence* or nature of a *sort* to be the *workmanship* of our *understanding*, to be a *thought* of our *minds*, which we might have, though nothing now existed without us. And in this sense it would more proper to say, that a *sort* is an *abstract idea*; for it is the very same thing with it. If they are referred to things without us (as when it is said, the *essence* of a *sort* of things is an *abstract idea*) the meaning of the expression is, that the common *essence* and nature of all those things (i. e. all that we know, conceive, or think of them) which has occasioned us to sort them together is only a collection of *real, secondary, sensible qualities*, co-existing in them all, and in no other things: in this sense it would be more proper to say, that the *essence* of all things sorted is an *abstract idea*, or a collection of *real, &c. qualities*.

The simple thoughts of these single *qualities* make up our complex thought of the whole collection, to which thought we give a *name*, which mediately or secondarily signifies the collection of *qualities* also; and hence the collection is called the *nominal essence* of those things (because it is that *essence*, which the *name* stands for in opposition to the *real essence*, or internal constitution

tion of them, which we have no knowledge or thought of, and consequently can make no name for.

Ibid. page 446, line 28. *Now since nothing.*—This reasoning seems not valid, for it may be said, that to have a *conformity*, &c. and to have the *essence*, &c. are still different things, though both are required to the being of a *man*. It might perhaps be made valid thus—since *nothing can be a man* but only by having a *conformity*, &c. and nothing can be a *man* but what has the *essence*, &c. Sc. since both these things, hitherto appearing *different* are the only way for any thing to be a *man*, they must needs be *one* and the *same* thing. It might have been sufficient to prove this point to have shewn, that these *abstract ideas* are *all* that we think of particular things, all the conceptions we have of them when we make them into *sorts*.

§ 13, page 447, line 7. The *sorting* of them.—Though nature has made them thus *alike*, they could not have been *sorted*, or had *general names* given, but for the mind of man.

Ibid. page 448, line 40. *He will never be able.*—He means, I presume, because these *supposed real essences* are unknown, so that we cannot tell in any of them, for instance, when there is *all* of it, and when not.

§ 14, page 448, line 12. *It having been more.*—This instance proves that these contending parties have *different ideas* of a *man*. For whereas a certain shape of the body is a leading quality in this *idea*, one of these parties it is plain admits of a greater latitude in that shape than another.

Ibid. It is both obscure and confounding to say that *abstract ideas* are the very *essence* of those things which are sorted; for this does not keep up the *difference* between the act of the mind and its object; for the *idea* surely is in the *mind*, and the properties which make

the *essence* are in the *objects*, and would be there whether we conceived them or not.*

* § 15, page 449. Essence is the very nature of any being, whether it be actually existing or no.†

Ibid. Here (not to mention that it is not extraordinary for the signification of a derivative word, especially in a philosophical *sense*, (acceptation) to differ widely from the grammatical meaning according to the form it is derived in) the word Being, I think is equivocal, and signifies the internal unknown constitution of things, less properly, at least less commonly, than any other thing. But granting that essence, being, and the internal unknown constitution of substances are properly the same thing: since this internal unknown constitution once existed not, and yet was known then in the divine intellect, it must have been in idea there; so that at last in any acceptation of the word we must resolve the essence of things into idea, and make it the same with their nature.‡

Ibid. If essence and existence have different meanings (as in propriety it seems they should) by essence I think can only be meant, the abstract natures of things, or the ideas of the things in the divine intellect, which were before the things existed.§

Mr. Locke rather takes essence for the being of any thing; though we usually say, such a property is of the nature or essence of a thing, taking either word indifferently; but never that it is of the being of it, which rather imports its existence.

It would have seemed strange if Dr. Clarke had called his most excellent book, a demonstration of the essence or internal unknown constitution (instead of the being and attributes) of God, And then if substances

* Lee, p. 205.

† *Ibid.* p. 23.

‡ Baxt. N. p. 144.

§ Baxt. p. 143.

have unknown essences and other things have not, it will follow that there are two different species of essences, or that other things besides substances have no essence at all. It was this put Mr. Locke upon the distinction of real and nominal essences; and asserting that all our moral and mathematical ideas, as of virtue, vice, &c. a cube, a square, &c. (things of as fixed and immutable natures, as any that can be named) having only according to his distinction nominal essences, are nothing but the mere arbitrary compositions of ideas in our minds; which admitted, would be of the greatest disservice both in philosophy and practice.*

Some men pretend to have Mr. Locke's authority for insinuating that the unknown constitution of things is in itself nothing, and that substance or what he calls substratum, is but empty sound. But they are mistaken, for Mr. Locke allows that the internal, &c. is *something*, upon which their discoverable qualities are owned to depend; and this other thing, if we speak of it at all, must be called subject, support, substance, or some such name; and though we have no particular idea of it, yet we know that it is, unless properties could subsist by themselves, and if there be neither property nor subject, there would be nothing left to exist.†

§ 17, page 450, line 19. The frequent production. — See § 14. The force of this argument I take to be this, it is impossible there should be a set, determinate number of these *essences*, because these productions are daily instances of *new essences*, which appears from hence, that they have not the properties of *the old essences*.

§ 19, page 452. There is but one being which includes existence in the very essence of it, and i. e. God. But the actual existence of every creature is very dis-

* Baxt. p. 147. † Ibid. p. 144.

riact from its essence, for it *may be* or *may not be*, as God please.*

§ 19, page 452, line 43. And is founded on the.— This seems not to be true, because the *idea* might subsist in men's minds, though they never express it by any *sign*.

CH A P. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

§ 6, page 455. **T**HIS definition is the definition of a word, not a thing, that is a substance or a mode of it. Definition is usually reckoned the name of a proposition, in which the property or properties of a thing is so set forth as to distinguish it from every thing else; or in shewing the essence of that thing, or the genus and differentia, which is much the same.

§ 7, page 455. Single qualities are undefinable, 1st, Because definition is an explanation; but single qualities cannot be explained, because they are sensible, and must be known by the help of proper organs, and when they are so known, no words can make them plainer. 2dly, Because the reason or cause of them cannot be known at all.

§ 8, page 455, line 1. *The not observing*.—These instances seem not pertinent; for the philosophers, especially the *Cartesians*, in defining the words *motion* and *light*, did not intend to raise or produce in men's minds the *ideas* those terms stand for, but only to shew the effects of the one and cause of the other: sc. what follows in matter from its having the affection called

* Watts Log. p. 11.

motion, or its being in that state in the present system of things ; and what sort of particles they are that raise that *idea* in our minds we call *light*.

C H A P. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Modes and Relations.

§ 2, page 463, line 5. **W**HEREIN they differ.— The author seems to confound making of *complex ideas* with *abstracting* them ; for the *abstracting* of *complex ideas* is as much the work of the understanding, as the *abstracting* of *simple ones*, though *making* is not.

§ 3, page 463. *Mixed modes* are no more creatures of the understanding than substances ; for a man can as easily distinguish between *virtue and vice*, as he can between some animals, plants, &c. by the light of nature, and such rules as God has given every man by which to compare actions : and if *abstract ideas* be only the signs of *real actions*, the actions applied to particular cases, appear as manifestly different as the substances themselves. And as barbarous as some men are pleased to represent others, yet most sort of actions that are esteemed good or bad, are so distinguished (however different their names for them are) all the world over ; and therefore are not voluntary or arbitrary.*

§ 8, page 467, line 19. *And the versura* (a sort of brokening) of the *Romans*, &c.— This does not prove that the *ideas* of the actions were *voluntary* and *arbitrary*, for let the *Romans* or *Jews* have agreed upon any other words to signify those actions, yet the actions would have been the same : nor can I learn, how the names

* Lee, p. 210.

of these mixed actions tye the actions together, more than the names of substances do their properties.*

§ 9, page 468, line 20. Who makes the.—See c. 3, § 14.

§ 12, page 470. I always thought it as impossible for a man to form any notion of *justice and gratitude* without comparing his own, or the sensible *actions* of others with the *laws of nature*, which incline him to the practice of them, as of a horse and iron, without *seeing* them, or having them represented to him by somewhat like them. For it seems plain to me, that these which he calls *mixed modes*, are nothing else but *mixed actions*, with their circumstances, and that we have no *idea* at all of them in our minds upon hearing or reading their *general names*, till they are resolved into particular *actions*, and their *modes* which constitute them.†

§ 15, page 472, line 9. Unless a man will.—He intimates that if we endeavour to frame the *complex ideas* before we learn the *names*, we shall be apt to make such *new* and *strange* compositions, as will be utterly unknown to others, and useless to us in our conversation with them.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

§ 1, page 474, line 21. **T**HAT might be a fun.—So. one man may have one *abstract idea* of a globe of fire, and another have another, different from the former, which could not be if the *abstract idea* of a globe of fire (in which all globes of

* Lee, p. 210.

† Ibid. p. 211.

fire are comprehended (were an *idea* of the *real* nature of it, for that being but *one*, there could then be but one *abstract idea*.

§ 2, page 474, line 7. *This though it be all*.—He now speaks of the lowest *nominal essence* that can be made in the *predicamental scale*, which contains indeed all that we know of *substances* ranked under it. As the *nominal essence* expressed by the word *gold*, contains all that we know of particular pieces of *gold*, ranked under it. But highest in the *predicamental scale*, the *nominal essence* expressed by the word *tree*, for instance, doth not contain all that we know of an oak, ash, elm, &c. ranked under it.

§ 4, page 475. Every thing that is *essential*, is essential to individuals; for *essential* is only the title or name we give to those *properties and qualities*, which distinguish *individuals* from all other *individuals* that want them; and *properties* are not in *generals*, but in *individuals*.*

And the measure and boundary of each species will not be the abstract ideas, but the properties of each individual, which would be in them whether we conceived them or not.†

Ibid. line 15. *Other creatures*.—The shape of my body may be lost by an accident, but may also be made to belong to a parcel of matter united to a spirit very *different* from mine, and from any human soul; which is still some further proof, that it is not *essential* to my body; the same may be said of the reason of my mind.

Ibid. line 19. *None of these are essential, &c.*—Though disease or accident may take away man's life, yet it cannot annihilate his soul, the thinking substance, nor destroy those thoughts, by which he is *distinguishable* from all bodies, and all other *individual spirits*; and

* Lee, p. 213.

† *Ibid.*

those properties so retained we call the *essence of the individual spirit*. None of these alterations are made merely by our thoughts; the mind has no more to do therein but to observe the properties in each individual, as made by nature, and give the substances wherein they are common or different names.*

§ 5, page 476, line 1. *Thus if the idea.*—Sc. If I take a thing in my hand, and say this is a *body*, then *extension* alone, or *extension* and *solidity* both (according as my *abstract idea of body* is) is *essential* to it, sc. while I suppose it to be a *body* and no longer.

Ibid. line 9. *Should there be found.*—A parcel of matter considered as such can never want any thing *essential* to it; it is what the *Creator* designed it, perfect in its kind. But if any sort of *matter*, iron, be proposed as a *standard*, it may be void of something *essential* to its being of that sort.

Ibid. page 447, line 4. *Or could it be demanded.*—There could be no room for this question till some sort of *matter*, iron, be proposed as a *standard* and measure of *essential* and *specific*, from which it might *essentially* and *specifically* differ.

Ibid. line 9. *For I would.*—Vide c. 3, § 13. He will never be able to know.

Ibid. line 13. *All such patterns.*—Sc. had we not made a *abstract complex idea* (consisting of a particular set of qualities co-existing united) as a *pattern* and *standard* to which all parcels of *matter* were to be reduced that had that particular set of qualities. Were it not, I say, for this *abstract idea*, all the qualities of this parcel of matter, I cut my pen with, would be one as *essential* to it as another. But this *abstract idea* being made, whenever I supposed the parcel of matter, I mentioned, to be agreeable to it, its *quality* of obeying the *condition* is *essential* to it: sc. it is more *essential* to

* Lee, p. 215.

its being iron, than to its malleableness, though not to its being a parcel of matter, or metal.

Ibid. line 16. *And every thing.*—Sc. one thing as much as another, though in reality nothing at all.

This one general sentiment seems to run through this excellent performance, viz. *that the essences of things are utterly unknown to us, and therefore all our pretences to distinguish the essences of things can reach no farther than mere nominal essences, &c.* Now that we may do justice to this great author, we must consider that he confines this sort of discourse only to the *essence of simple ideas*, the *essence of substances*, as appears cap. 4, § 6, lib. 3, for he allows the *names of mixed modes always to signify the real essences of their species*, cap. 5, and that in the distinction of their essences, *there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in natural*, cap. 6, § 40, 41. Though it must be confessed he scarce makes any distinction between the *definition of the name*, and the *definition of the thing*, cap. 4; and sometimes the current of his discourse decries the knowledge of essences in such general terms as may justly give occasion to mistake.*

We can demonstrate several eternal truths concerning the natures or essences of things. For to shew the necessity or necessary consistence of these eternal properties (i. e. as being originally, eternally consistent ideas) is to demonstrate eternal truths concerning their natures.†

§ 6, page 477. A late author hath rightly observed that essence is explained by the chief and radical property of a thing, or all the properties of it. Hence the chief and radical property of a thing is the essence in idea, though the thing should not exist nor have any internal unknown constitution. Essence is very diffe-

* Vide Watts Log. p. 114.

† Baxt. p. 302.

rent from existence, the essence or nature of things is invariable, and their existence only contingent.*

Ibid. line 9. *But essence.*—Because even these real essences are not essential to, or inseparable from any particular parcel of matter; for it is not essential to the parcel of matter I have now on my finger, to have that particular disposition of its insensible parts that it has, it might as well have had, or still have, another.

Ibid. line 12. *Properties belong only to species, not to individuals.*—But let a man try to satisfy another's hunger by his own eating, or to make another conscious of his pleasures or pains, and he will find that properties belong to individual substances or particular men, and not to the specific name, or general word *man*.

Ibid. line 12. *Properties belonging.*—By *properties* he means sensible discoverable qualities, which he hath already shewn are no otherwise essential to individuals than as they are supposed to be of a *species*. And since these *properties* have an inseparable connexion with the essence called the *real* they must stand and fall together. So that if *properties* are essential to things only upon the supposal of their being of a *species*, the *real essence* can be essential upon no other account.

Ibid. page 472, line 8. *But there is.*—He should have said here to which any of these real essences (from these qualities flow) are so annexed; for it is of the *real essences* he is now speaking.

§ 7, page 478, line 3. *Substances are.*—Sc. because it has that nominal essence; because that abstract complex idea we denote by the word, *horse, tree, &c.* agrees to it. For this reason only, upon this ground alone, it is ranked under this *sort*, and not because it has such or such *real essence*, for that we know nothing of.

* Baxt. p. 152, 302.

§ 9, page 480, line 44. To try his skill.—A man may pretend to distinguish *sheep or goats* by their *real essences* into several *sorts*, when indeed he doth it by their *nominal essences*, which are known to him. But these animals *Cassiovary* and *Querechinchio* (which he is supposed to see, and not to know how many or what *sensible qualities* make up the *complex idea* that denominates, and bounds the *species*) he cannot distinguish, so that if another *Cassiovary* be brought something different from the former, but within the bounds of the *species*, he will not be able to say, whether it be of that sort, or of the sort of *Querechinchio's*; hence it appears his pretences are vain, and that he distinguishes things into *sorts* by their *nominal essences*, and not by their *real*, for if he did it by the *real*, he might as well distinguish *Cassiovary* from *Querechinchio* as *sheep* from *goats*, since he knows the *real essence* of the two former, as much as that of the two latter.

§ 11, page 481, line 5. *Evident from*.—The force of the argument lies in this. We cannot rank spirits well, and distinctly into different sorts, because we have so few ideas of reflexion that are different to make various combinations of. This shews that when we do rank and sort things, we do it by such combinations of *ideas*, and by the *real essences* of things: for they are doubtless as distinct and different, and as much unknown to us, in *spirits*, as in *corporeal substances*, though the *qualities* we attribute to them are not.

Ibid. page 482, line 54. *Who yet*.—He seems to suppose that all the difference between God and the *highest order* of *spirits*, in our *idea* of each of them, is only one degree of *existence*, *knowledge*, &c. But is vastly more than so, being a difference between *finite* degrees, and *infinite*, which bear no proportion, if those words, *infinitely more remote*, respect the number of *simple ideas*, which should be put into the *idea* of God, more than into the *idea* of other *spirits*: it must be confessed that upon this ac-

count our *ideas of God* and of other *spirits* are very indistinct, for want of that vast number of *ideas* which should enter into the *idea of God*, and which we have not put to it.

§ 13, page 483. *Ice* is without doubt a different *sort* or *species* from *water*, because it has distinct properties; but the man that calls it *hardened water* is no more mistaken than if he had called *melted wax*, *fluid wax*; from whence I infer that giving *names* depends upon every one's experience; but not making *essences*; that is a work of *nature*, not of mere *thoughts* or *ideas*.*

§ 26, page 490. line 39. *Whereby it is evident.*—It is not evident that those who rejected the *fœtus* made only the *outward figure*, and not the *faculty of reasoning essential* to a *man*; they might notwithstanding make *reason* as *essential* as the others, who received the *fœtus*. But a certain shape of the body (admitting indeed of some variety, but within some certain bounds) being a leading *quality* in the *idea of man*; and the only indication we have that *reason* will be joined to such a body; those who reject the *fœtus* admit not so great a latitude in that *shape* as those who receive it.

§ 28, page 492, line 4. *To the making.*—These words till you come to *in the first of these*, seem put as it were in a parenthesis; and by the words any *nominal essence*, is meant any one, and the same *nominal essence*.

Ibid. line 5. *First that the ideas.*—This is more than to say, that a *nominal essence* is a *complex idea*.

Ibid. line 8. *Exactly the same.*—Sc. as to *sort* and *kind*.

Ibid. line 9. *For if two abstract.*—These words relate to the foregoing; *secondly*, that the *particular ideas* so united, and only to them.

* Lee, p. 217.

Ibid. line 11. *In the first of these.*—These words refer to those in the beginning of the §, *these nominal essences of substances.*

§ 38, page 501, line 16. *In the different.*—So, because the collections of *simple ideas* expressed by the word *stock* are almost the same, denoted by the word *hound*; these are not distinct *species* of animals; whereas the collections of *simple ideas* denoted by the words, *spaniel* and *elephant*, are different, therefore they are different *sorts* of animals.

§ 43, page 503, line 22. *But because.*—Because it is difficult by known names to lead men into the thoughts of things stript of those *specific* differences we give them; and yet it is necessary that men should be lead into those thoughts in treating of *specific ideas and names*: upon these accounts, it is better to use examples than words in this matter.

Ibid. line 24. *To make the different.*—That is to shew how the consideration the mind has of *specific ideas* we call *modes*, and their *names* at one time is different from what it has of them at another: as also the consideration the mind has of these *ideas* is different from that which it has of the *ideas of substances*.

VOL. II. CHAP. VIII.

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

§ 1, page 4. **BY** *concrete terms* is commonly meant the names of substances, given them either on the account of one quality or property, or their relation to one another; and by *abstract terms* the common names of those qualities, properties, or actions observed in substances compared with one another, in

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those

those qualities, properties, or actions, without regard to any other of properties or actions.*

§ 2, page 5, line 13. *We have very few, &c.*—The reason is because no two or more substances can so easily be like one another in every one of their properties or qualities, as they may in some one *leading* quality; and therefore it is observable, that where an offer has been made at abstract terms from substances, it is only to express some *peculiar* quality, and not all the *qualities*; as in *aquosity, fieriness, &c.*

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

§ 2, page 6, line 1. *AS to the first of these, &c.*—This is not clear; 1, Because deaf and dumb persons, without doubt, remember their own thoughts without words. 2dly, When persons talk to themselves their thoughts precede their words, or excite their remembrance of their words, just contrary to what occurs in conversation or reading.†

§ 5, page 7. The doubtfulness of words seems rather to *arise from* the different experience of the persons using, hearing, or reading these words, than the uncertainty of their signification.

The cases in which they are generally doubtful are,
1. When words are used, which in the common language of the country have very different significations.
2. When words are relative, and the reference is different in the mind of the speaker from the hearer.
3. When words may be taken with a less or greater latitude, as religion, grace, faith, &c.
4. When words are used to signify actions, that agree in some particular circumstances or modes with other

* Lee, p. 221. † Ibid.

actions, that do not agree with them in all, and are therefore in strictness, to be reputed metaphorical.*

Ibid. page 8, line 13. *Where the signification.*—The author never mentions this case in the following discourse: but he means, I suppose, that this happens in substances where the names signify a collection of qualities which are different from the real essence of a thing, being the effects of it.

§ 6, page 8. I. *Because of that great composition.*—The multiplicity of the ideas cannot be the cause of the doubtfulness of such words; but either the neglect, ignorance or prejudice of the person speaking or hearing.†

§ 7, page 9. II. *Because the names, &c.*—This too seems rather imputable to the prejudices of the several persons speaking or hearing, and not to the words themselves, or the want of standards: for I reckon the standards of moral actions to be as fixed, as of substances natural or artificial; or even of simple ideas, or qualities.‡

All men, free from prejudice, can as easily distinguish between moral good and evil, as between white and black, from their relation to the laws of nature, and the land, which is as unalterable by the power of names, or the ideas of particular persons, as the properties or essences of substances. §

Ibid. line 21. *What the word murder, &c.*—This is true, but not to the main purpose: for the whole question is, Whether those actions of which these words are the signs, be not immutably agreeable or disagreeable to the laws of God, and consequently good or evil; and whether those laws of nature be not as certain and fixed, as the very laws of motion?||

* Lee, p. 222.

† *Ibid.* p. 223.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Lee, p. 223.

|| *Ibid.* p. 225.

§ 8, page 10. It is not at all material whether the word be proper or not in its original signification. Though the word *justice* be derived from *jus*, which signifies *broth* as well as right, yet being commonly used for the virtue of giving every one his due, that makes it proper.*

§ 9, page 10, line 35. *And hence we see, &c.*—He should have distinguished between the common or necessary principles, and controversial points: for however large the commentators have been in the latter, yet in the former, which are the main, we may observe almost an universal consent, allowing something for the manner of expression.†

§ 11, page 12, line 5. *The names of substances.*—But neither are the names of substances doubtful; because they are supposed conformable to their real essences as made by nature; for the names of substances are given them by particular persons, according to the properties they observe in them, common to other individual substances.‡

§ 23, page 21. *Since then the precepts, &c.*—Yet ought we as much to adore the goodness of God for his special providence about those ancient writings, for the preserving a lasting standard for our faith and manners.§

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

§ 5, page 24. **T**HE author seems guilty of this himself in his use of the word *idea*, for he uses it sometimes for the act of perception, thus

* Lee, p. 225. † Ibid. p. 226. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid. p. 228.

sensation is an *idea*; sometimes for the immediate objects of that perception, thus *thoughts* are *ideas*; at other times for the qualities or actions in objects, whether known or perceived by us or not; thus *figure*, *motion*, *bulk*, &c. are *ideas*, though not known.*

§ 6, page 25, line 22. *Logic* is the art of using reason well in our inquiries after truth, and the communication of it to others.†

§ 15, page 30. We have no *idea* either of *matter* or *body* in general, because they are only the names of substances; but only of the particulars that have these common names, and so every single parcel of *matter* has as good right to the name of *body*, as every single *body* has to the common name of *matter*.

§ 17, page 32, line 27. *Why might not Plato.*—The force of this reasoning seems to be this: if the word *man* was thought to denote nothing but a *complex idea* of qualities discoverable in a certain species of things, it might as well stand for *Plato's* as for *Aristotle's*; for each of these is a *complex idea* of that *species* we are of. The reason therefore why it does not seem to stand so well for the one as the other is, because it is supposed to denote the *real essence* of this *species*; and one of these *ideas* is thought to come nearer this *real essence* than another. But it may here be said, that though the word *man* be supposed to denote only the most exact, perfect, distinguishing, *complex idea* of qualities observable in a sort of things; *Aristotle's idea* even in this respect might be preferred before *Plato's*.

* Lee, p. 230. Vide c. 11, § 27. † Watts Log. p. 1.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

§ 20, page 52, line 17. **FOR** it is the *shape*.—The opposition is not well made betwixt the *shape* and the *reasoning faculty*, in reference to the *determining* of the *species*; for *reasoning* may go as far toward that, as the *shape* even in the *idea* of those who kill these monstrous births; *shape* therefore in their opinion rather *indicates* than *determines* the *species*; *sc.* is the only sign we have to know when *reason* will be joined to the *animal body*.

The common definition of man is very faulty, animal rationale; because the animal is not rational; the rationality of man arises from the mind to which the animal is united. 2. Because if a spirit should be united to a horse, and make it a rational being, surely this would not be a man. It is evident therefore that the peculiar shape must either enter into the definition of a man to render it just and perfect; and for want of a full description thereof all our definitions are defective.*

BOOK IV. CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

§ 2, page 59. **KNOWLEDGE** consists in our perception of the *relation* that substances have to their own modes to us, or one another: and all *truth* is only joining or disjoining these substances according to such relation.†

§ 7, page 64, line 2. *That of actual*.—Here we may observe that the author does not say, as in three

* Watts Log. Not. p. 109.

† Lee, p. 235.

preceding

preceding cases, that there is an *agreement* or *disagreement* betwixt our *ideas*; for there are no two ideas or thoughts of the mind compared together, as in the former cases, but one idea (or thought) compared as it were with some *real* thing existing without us, which produced it in our minds, and answers to it, as a cause to its effect. As therefore in three former cases we may have intuitive knowledge of general propositions by a perception of the agreement or disagreement of our *ideas* (or thoughts of our minds) which are all abstract, and do not suppose the existence of any things at all without us, now we have these thoughts, though they were perhaps the first occasion of our getting many of them; which knowledge is the consequence of the *ideas* which are in our minds producing there by their agreement or disagreement, perceived *general* and certain propositions. So in this fourth case, we can only have sensitive knowledge of *particular* propositions (sc. that such and such a particular thing exists without us) and that not only by perceiving any agreement or disagreement of *ideas* (or thoughts in our minds) of which there is in this case no comparison made, but by perceiving, sometimes ideas or thoughts are raised in our minds, and affect us with pleasure or pain, whether we will or no: which must be owing to things existing without us, and operating upon us; which *knowledge* is the consequence of the existence of things producing *ideas* in our minds, by our senses; and though it is not altogether so certain as intuitive *knowledge*, yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of *knowledge*.*

Ibid. Real existence can never be proved merely by ideas, because we can never have any ideas at all of substances, and consequently not of their relation to their own properties or modes, or to other substances;

* Vide B. 4, c. 11, § 12, &c.

this, I say, cannot be proved, because there will always be wanting an idea by which we must prove, or explain that relation.*

§ 8, page 66. 2. All the *habitual knowledge* we can have of any of the properties of substances except they be visible, must be gained by rational inferences, that such and such causes will produce such and such effects, or such effects argue such causes, which are maxims, when applied to particulars.†

CH A P. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

§ 1, page 69. *INTUITIVE knowledge* is not real but upon supposition of the truth of the senses; nor any proposition true or false but upon supposition of things without us, and that our *senses are true*; which I am confident cannot be proved by way of *ideas*; for the *ideas* are only the signs of the things, as words are the signs of *ideas*; but neither *ideas* or words are signs of any thing, if the *things* themselves be not supposed, and consequently no *proposition* can truly be formed about them.‡

§ 2, page 70. If *demonstrative knowledge* be of any use, we must presuppose the truth of the senses as well in this as in *intuitive knowledge*.§

For in each step of the *demonstration* there must be an *intuitive knowledge*, or rather a *sensitive knowledge*, a perception by the senses: otherwise the mind could not with any certainty judge of the connexion between the several objects in the progression of its thoughts.||

* Lee, p. 238.

† Ibid. p. 289.

‡ Ibid. p. 240.

§ Lee, p. 241.

|| Ibid. p. 242.

§ 11, page 74, line 2. *And not quantity.*—These words refer only to the word *counted*, and not to *made*, and the meaning is this: we do not reckon two whitenesses to be different because we know the precise number of corpuscles which produce each of them, but because our senses perceive each of them to be *distinct ideas*, which since our senses cannot do in the most minute degrees and differences in *whiteness*, therefore this is not a thing capable of demonstration.

§ 14, page 76. *Sensitive knowledge* is really the foundation both of *intuitive* and *demonstrative*.*

Ibid. page 77, line 8. *This certainty is as great.*—This is a very obscure expression; the meaning of which seems to be this; when I remove my body near to something, which I fancy sends *light* to me at some distance, though I am not certain perhaps that there is any thing *really existing* which enlightened me at a distance, and to which I approached; yet I am *certain*, that in all such cases, I shall feel *pleasure* or *pain*. There is so much *certainty* as will assure me of *happiness* or *misery*. The *certainty* I have therefore in all such circumstances may be said to be commensurate, or proportionate to, or as great as my *happiness* or *misery*; and this is as much *certainty* as we need look after.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

§ 6, page 79. **I**T is an utter impossibility that matter can ever become by any power a living, self-moving substance; seeing, matter must resist all change of its present state, as it is a solid substance.†

Page 80, note, line 10. *Whether* should not be whether God *can*, but whether he *has* made matter capable

* Lee, p. 244.

† Vide Baxt. p. 10, 27, 29.

of thinking; *sc.* whether the actions or operations of which we are conscious, and for which we have the common name of thinking, can be performed by mere matter, and then it will be easy to discover by all the phenomena in nature, that matter can no more think than a triangle can have four angles. For let matter have what figure, bulk, motion, or position, by parts that can be imagined, it can no more perceive or be conscious of its own actions or motions than a stone can rise from the ground of its own accord, or without the impulse of another body. Whether Omnipotency can add to matter a faculty of thinking, we do not care for disputing, because we have no notion of it abstracted from infinite wisdom; and therefore are content to say, that according to the present state of the world, and of the experience of our faculties, that if matter should think, it would as much cease to be matter, as a triangle would cease to be a triangle that had four angles.*

Ibid. It is no less than a contradiction, &c. —But there is nothing discoverable from the idea of God or matter that can make it a contradiction for God to be material, but what will as fully demonstrate that it is a contradiction for the souls of men to be only modified matter; not from the idea of God, because the complex idea of God is made up only of simple ideas which we find in ourselves magnified in infinitum; not from the idea of matter, for we have none that is general, or which extends to all the individual systems of it in the universe. Ergo, &c.†

The whole argument that matter cannot think nor move itself, concludes in much fewer words from considering the endless divisibility of it.‡

Divisibility is such an affection of substance as shews on the one hand that matter because divisible cannot

* Vide Bayle Dict. p. 1924, under Leucippus. Not. on King. p. 38. Rel. of Nat. p. 186. Dr. Clark to Dodwell. Ditton's Append. to Resurr. Law on King. p. 134.

† Lee, p. 249. ‡ Baxt. N. p. 85.

think or be a living substance; and on the other, that spiritual substance, because thinking cannot be divisible or have parts.*

Page 83. A man may warrantably say, that to effect a contradiction is not the object of any power; nothing less limits Omnipotence: and such it is to effect that a substance, which as solidly extended must resist all change of state, should, while remaining solidity extended become of *dull dead earth*, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. (Vide *infr.* p. 145) So that notwithstanding of this complaint, as if the Bishop had been unreasonable in opposing his conclusion, it appears the reason was good, and that he could not go one step farther without destroying the essence of matter, viz. solid extension; and that he had already gone a step or two too far, in making the *spontaneous mover* in an elephant, and the external mover in the mechanism, both of plants and animals, properties of dull and dead earth.†

But it is perfectly absurd to say that infinite power may superadd a property to a substance incapable of receiving it. The substance of being first divisible, and then the parts of it remaining dead, the property can have no subject of inherion but the junction of dead parts to dead parts. But that the junction of dead particles, or cohesion of them, itself a property, should be the subject of another property, is an absurdity Mr. Locke himself hath sufficiently exposed.‡

If this *substance* or substratum be so *unknown* a thing, as Mr. Locke supposes, how can I deny any thing concerning it? Or at least how can I be sure that God and the material world have not one common substance? Mr. Locke indeed endeavours to guard his principles or doctrines from this objection: but I think he neither does, nor perhaps could he effectually secure them such unhappy consequences.§

* Baxt. p. 106. † Ibid. p. 86.

‡ Baxt. p. 165. § Watts, p. 63.

Solid *extension*, and a cogitative power, are real substances, for if we nullify them they leave mere nothing behind them.*

Page 86, *last line*. But here, &c.—Here Mr. Locke supposes that sensation implies thinking as much as it implies perception, which, I conceive, is quite wrong, (vide Baxt. p. 90.) Must it not appear more wonderful to work a piece of mechanism in the bounds of a flea or mite, than in the bounds of an horse or elephant? These animalcula are therefore as great instances of the wisdom and power of God, as the largest living creatures. Again, does not this mechanism as much require an external immaterial mover, as any mechanism whatever, and who supplies this? lastly, they move spontaneously. The objection supposes this: 'spontaneous motion is different from mechanical motion by the terms; therefore it must require a different immaterial principle. And where is the difficulty in all this? Or rather in what particular is it not demonstrative. †

To suppose immortality founded on immateriality is extremely wrong. The human soul being rational, and the brute soul not, the one a moral agent, and the other not, is the foundation of a very consistent and solid distinction between the one and the other as to immortality.‡

Page 88, *line 17*. But if you mean, &c.—Mr. Locke hath well observed, that they are different considerations that prove the soul immortal and immaterial; but when he says, *that it is* as evident to him, that brutes reason in some instances as that they have sense (l. 2. c. 11, § 11.) and here takes it for granted that it is but *mere matter with superadded properties* that thus

* Watts, p. 56.

† Vide Baxt. p. 3, 6, N. Keil's Introduct. ad Phys. lect. 5: Vide p. 120, v. 1. Bp. Br. on the Und. p. 173. Baxt. p. 108. Burnet Demonstr. p. 92.

‡ Baxt. p. 108, N.

reasons, tho' he offers no proof of either of these assertions; and since all men suppose the matter of the brute body finally dissipated at death, this gives an ignorant sceptic courage to affirm that it may be so with the human soul. It is by no means commendable in Mr. Locke (who allows the soul to be immaterial, yet contends it might have been material) to maintain a point that hath so bad a tendency, gratis, and barely for maintaining's sake.*

They who run the parallel between the human soul and that of brutes, suppose still the same powers in both; but surely rationality must be founded in some power which the brute soul as such has not: but granting the activity of the brute soul, when separated, this would not certainly infer the human soul is unactive and impercipient after death, but rather conclude the contrary the more strongly, and perhaps do no difference to philosophy:†

§ page 97 line 7. *The word spirit.*—But with submission, I think no man ever before defended the propriety of an expression, exclusive of the truth of it, in a philosophical controversy. If the acceptance of a word is such as determines the question; without farther argument, as in this case, to justify the propriety of it then, is to make the common use of language decide in points of philosophy. If Cicero or Virgil had wrong ideas as to the immateriality of the soul, tho' they expressed these wrong ideas right, that does not mend the matter. The dispute between the bishop and Mr. Locke was, whether matter could think, and not the classical acceptance of the word *spiritus*.‡

Page 103, line 1. *It being impossible for us, &c.*—This is founded upon what Mr. Locke elsewhere endeavours to

* Baxt. p. 87.

† Vid. Baxt. p. 156.

‡ Baxt. p. 98.

maintain, viz. that our ideas are only *arbitrary* combinations, without connexion to any thing in nature.*

§ 7, page 106. All knowledge, or the certainty of the truth of any proposition, is founded upon a tacit constant supposition both of the truth of our senses and faculties and of the *real existence and real relation* between those things which are affirmed and denied of each other, and not of their agreement or disagreement in *idea* only.†

§ 16. page 110. Tho' our knowledge of substances is not adequate, yet if our senses and faculties be right, (which must be supposed in intuitive and demonstrative knowledge) then so far as any man's experience reaches, 'tis as certain and real knowledge as what the author calls *intuitive and demonstrative*.‡

§ 18, page 111. I take this to comprehend all the four sorts which the author mentions; but by relative knowledge he means only the relation of numbers, lines, figures, angles to each other, which is known by demonstration, and perhaps also of *abstract ideas* in morality, which can be of no use if in *idea* only, without being applied to things without us.§

§ 18, page 112, line 31. *Where, &c.*—*Ibid.* line 40. *No government, &c.*—The two propositions here mentioned are certainly true, but of no manner of use, because the sense of them is *identical*, amounting to no more than this, *where there is no right, there is no unrighteousness*; and every government governs.||

§ 21, page 116. If a man doubts of the existence of the things he sees and feels, there is no third idea, but will need a fourth, nor fourth, but will stand as much

* Baxt. p. p. 86, p. 107. † Lee, p. 250. ‡ Lee, p. 251.
§ Lee, p. 252. Lee, p. 253.

in need of a fifth, to prove its own existence, and so in *infinitum*; endless scepticism.*

§ 23, page 117, line 6. Want of *ideas* is want of *knowledge* or want of nothing; and want of knowledge is but another phrase for ignorance, and differs no other-wise than the want of light does from darkness; the causes of ignorance therefore more properly assign'd to the *distance* or *minuteness* of some bodies.†

§ 28, page 122. This is not the cause of our ignorance, but the very ignorance itself, is the imperfection of our faculties that we complain of.†

§ 30, page 124. Some men are apt to assign another reason for this, viz. because many interests, lusts, and passions are more apt to mix in other discourses than merely in mathematics; and till all men's interests become the same, which is impracticable in this world, there would be differences in men's judgements, tho' they were never so well agreed in the signification of words.§

CHAP. IV.

On the Reality of Knowledge.

§ 3, page 127. **B**UT this very *conformity* is not discoverable in any case whatever merely by *ideas*.—There is nothing distinct from the power of the object, and the perceptions in the mind, and consequently their *conformity* to the reality of the things, or the real power in the objects, cannot be discovered for want of some *real third* thing to make that discovery.

* Lee, p 253.

† Ibid. p. 254.

§ Lee. p. 255.

§ 7, page 129. Mixt modes and relations are arbitrary combinations of ideas made without regard to any particular subject in which they may in here; they are evidently their own archetypes, and therefore cannot but be real and positive. They are what they are immutably and universally; their natures and essences must be the same wherever they are found, so long as the same number of ideas are included under the same word.*

Ibid. The general names of virtues and vices are the signs of the mind, observing such relation to the declared will of God, or our governors, and not the signs of any such fictions as general or *abstract ideas*, for there are none such in the world.†

§ 8, page 129. But this knowledge is neither true, real, certain, nor useful; not true, because truth is the connexion of things by words or other signs really connected or disjoined; not *certain*, because if things be barely possible, as is supposed in this case, the knowledge can rise no higher in degree than the possibility of the connexion or disjunction, and that's far enough from certainty; not *real*, because if the archetypes be more accurate than any thing without the mind, they are so far at least not real; nor *useful*, because if the ideas of actions are beyond any that are or ever were, and the ideas of lines, &c. more exact than any copies of them in bodies are, or ever were, they are not applicable to bodies, and consequently do not answer the end of knowledge, which is usefulness.‡

Ibid. Nor are Tully's Offices less true.—But Tully's offices are no farther true than 'tis possible for any one to observe them; and no one can rationally judge any thing is possible, that is not, nor ever was done, but by *special revelation*.§

* Note on K. p. 7

† Lee, p. 258.

‡ Ibid. 159.

§ Ibid.

Since most, &c.—But all the general propositions that I know are certain and real, are founded on a supposed real, not an imaginary existence.*

§ 9, page 131, line 13. *Just the same is it in moral knowledge.*—The case is not altogether the same, because the essence of a triangle, &c. is its real properties, and those will be unalterable indeed; but if the nominal and real essence of virtues and vices be the same (as according to the author's principles they are) then if a man alters the name he alters the essence in his own judgement; but 'tis otherwise in figures, &c.†

§ page 132, line 5. *Such are our ideas.*—But notwithstanding this pretended defect, all the real or certain knowledge we have or can have in this world is only of substances, and their modes on which their relation to us or one another is founded.‡

§ 12, page 132. But after all, what he calls substances are not substances. Men, gold, iron, &c. are not substances, but only the common names, the individuals only are real substances.§

§ 12, page 132. A changeling is a particular species of man, just as a person of a surprizing genius or extraordinary wisdom is a particular species of man in the other extreme. Man, is a common name, and every one will give names not according to what things really are in all particulars, but only what they seem to be: and therefore a changeling has the essence of a man, if by the word essence be meant the like properties or qualities by which it may be distinguished from every thing else that has not the same common name; but if by the word essence be meant the same individual properties and quality, in that sense it is not the same essence any

* Lee, p. 159 † Ibid. p. 260. ‡ Ibid. 260, § Ibid. p. 261.

more than two men, or two guineas have the same essence.*

What properties are visible those we know, and give them the common name of man, because we know no better, as we call guineas gold, because they are yellow and weighty, tho' they may want, for what we know, the property of being soluble in *aqua regia* †

§ 16, page 136. As for monstrous births we judge them a sort of creatures between man and beast, because they partake of the shape and features of both; and therefore esteem them the product of unnatural mixtures.‡

CHAP V.

Of Truth in General.

§ 2, page 136. **T**HE common definition of truth is the conjunction or disjunction of things according to the real relation those things have to each other. A mental truth or true mental proposition is, when our thoughts agree with the real relation which the things have to each other of which we think; and a verbal truth is, when the things themselves have that relation really with the words of which they are made the signs agree or disagree; whereas in our notion of truth, 'tis the agreement or disagreement only in ideas or words.§

§ 4, page 139. The best way to come at mental propositions is to consider what actions there could be in our minds, if we were born and continued deaf and dumb all our days, which is the case of some: that such affirm and deny or discern the agreement and disagreement of things so far as their observation reaches,

* Lee, p. 262. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid. p. 264.

there is no doubt ; and those are properly mental propositions, and are true when their thoughts agree or disagree with the real relation there is between the things they think of.*

CHAP. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

§ 5, page 146. **G**ENERAL propositions may be as certainly known to be true about substances as mathematical propositions. I am as ignorant of all the properties belonging to triangles, &c. as I am of all the active or passive powers of lead and gold : but what I know of lead or gold, or other substances, or so far as my experience goes, I know as certainly as I do any thing of those or any sort of figures, and can form as many true, certain, and universal propositions concerning them.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

§ 8, page 161. **T**HEY are said to be *præcognitis* & *præconcessis*, because the actions of children and ideots seem to be governed by them, even before they can pronounce the words in which they are expressed.

§ 9, page 162. Children know pleasure and pain, &c. before they know their names, or form propositions about them ; yet I guess they don't in their minds play with abstract ideas like babies, before they know that pleasure is pleasure, or pain is pain, &c. and yet

that knowledge is but that every thing is the same with itself and not another; and when they grow old enough to be philosophers, they don't need to be taught those truths any more than that a stranger is not their mother, &c. and that is all we mean by saying, these truths are *innate*.*

§ 11, page 165. The main use of these maxims is, for the solving less obvious or more general propositions into such obvious and universally acknowledged principles.†

Ibid. page 169, line 34. *They sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth.*—But if they stop wranglers mouths 'tis something; for that they would not do, if they were not the avowed principles of all the world; and as for bringing a man into any new knowledge, no body pretends any more than confirming him in the old, which otherwise they might want: and as for *influencing identical predications*, this I take to be a just and great encomium of them; for all the certainly true propositions in the world are not clearly perceived to be such till they are resolved into such identity or the negation of it.‡

§ 13, page 172. But all this while there is no fault in the maxims, but in the manner of probation; for in both cases the question is supposed, that which should be proved is first granted, and at that rate there is no need of maxims or ideas either.§

§ 18, page 175. But all this would have been saved by giving only some different appellation or the common name; *ex. gr.* as if the child had said, that a negro is not a white man; or that changelings are not rational: or that the third was a new sort of rational

* *I*ee, p. 274. † *Ibid.* p. 275. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 274. § *Ibid.* p. 275.
creature.

creature. The maxims had none of these wild inferences, but they are all the natural spawn of *abstract complex ideas*: and, therefore, notwithstanding these objections against maxims, they are of singular use in the ready proof of such propositions as are not discoverable by our senses where sensible ideas are not to be had, and that's the utmost we pretend. *Ex. gr.* We have no idea of the air, of animal spirits, or of God, yet are certain of their existence, by resolving our arguments into that maxim, *every effect must have a cause*. But of cause and effect we have no abstract general ideas, they are only general relative words or names.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Trifling Propositions.

§ 2, page 177. **I**T must be confessed that all *identical propositions* do not shew him that uses them, or make another wiser than he was supposed to be before: they only direct the attention of what he himself or the other said or thought before, in order to the making himself or the other wiser.—Words barely repeated are no proposition at all, 'tis the act of the mind apprehending that relation of the thing to itself that makes the proposition, and this is all that is pretended.†

§ 4, page 180. Such propositions are verbal indeed, the predicates are but explications of the subjects, but they are not the less instructive for being so. He that knows all the properties of those individuals that have the names of man or lead, need not to be informed that one is an animal, and the other a metal: but it is possible a person may have heard the words of animal and metal, and understand them, and yet not

have heard or understood the signification of man or lead ; and to such a one this is a short way of informing him, and consequently one method of improving knowledge.*

§ 7, page 192. If we invert the places of the subjects in these propositions (if it be true, that every man has a notion of God, then it is the property of that idea to be formed in the minds of men : and if it be true that every man can be cast into sleep by opium, then that is the property of opium :) it will appear, the predicate contains no more than the subjects ; so that either those two propositions are false, and consequently not instructive, or else they are as trifling as any before-mentioned.†

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

§ 1, page 186. 1. **T**HE *essences* of things are only the names of that which distinguishes one thing from another.

2. They are not the abstract ideas of things, because there are none such in the mind but of visible substances.

3. They are not made by us, but only the names of them from the several qualities or properties.

4. Existence is concerned in the essence of things, because we cannot conceive the one without the other.

5. General propositions do not concern existence, they being only the conjunction or disjunction of common names given to particular things, which are supposed by the mind to exist.

6. Particular propositions, though they likewise concern existence, yet do not declare the accidental union or separation of ideas, but the real relation that

* Lee, p. 277. † Ibid. p. 278.

is between substances and their modes, or between them and ourselves.*

7. The knowledge of our own existence is that of the real relation there is between a man's self and his own thoughts, and not the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, because in this case there can be no ideas distinct from the person himself and his own thoughts.†

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.

§ 2, page 188. **T**HE author, in one of his letters to the Bishop, says, he has waved the use of the word idea in this argument, on purpose to let it into men's minds, by common words, or known ways of expression.—But I doubt a better reason might be given, viz. that the ideal phrase would render it obscure, and as far as possible make it doubtful: for

The reason why any one is convinced of his own existence, is, because he is immediately conscious of his own thoughts; but of those thoughts he can have no idea, because they neither agree nor disagree, but as the objects or cause of them do: and therefore it is this agreement or disagreement arising from the variety of causes or objects that satisfies a man of his own existence, and not the agreement of the idea of himself with the abstract idea of existence, for of that barely he would have no idea or perception at all.‡

§ 3, page 188. Is there any idea of nothing in a man's mind? The mind can indeed by its natural power suppose any cause to suspend or withdraw its efficacy, and by its natural powers perceive where

* Lee, p. 280. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p. 286.

there is no real cause operating, there can be no real effect; but by this instance it may appear there are principles of reason, where there can be no perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas; for nothing is the negation of all ideas.

§ 4, *page 189.* This is an identical proposition, and therefore trifling: for being and existence is one and the same to the mind, with the properties of the thing existing; it is the same as to say, *what has its beginning from another, has its beginning from another*, and therefore the knowledge of this is not the agreement, &c. because they are in effect but one idea; what makes it a proposition is the mind's comparing that thing with itself, as it is in all certainly true, affirmative, identical propositions.

§ 5, *Ibid.* But not from the agreement between the idea of himself and the idea of perception and knowledge; because he can have no idea of perception or knowledge distinct from the knowledge or perception; to know or perceive is all one, as having an idea, unless an idea be something that is neither in nor out of the mind.

Ibid. But as we cannot separate the knowledge of existence from that of the things that do or have existed, it is the perception of real relation between the things themselves, and not the comparing the abstract idea of one time with that of another; because there are no such ideas, they are all pure nothing.*

* See, p. 286.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

§ 3, page 200. **B**UT I cannot conceive how we should have either intuitive or rational knowledge without supposing the existence of things without us, unless there could be thoughts of nothing, or reasoning about nothing.*

§ 13, page 207. But neither of these sort of propositions can be known, but upon supposition of the truth of our senses.†

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

§ 5, page 212. **B**UT it is as dangerous to deny all principles as to embrace false ones.‡

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgement.

§ 4, page 224. **T**HE common account is, that knowing when it is not used for a simple apprehension, is the perception of the necessary or immutable relation between any things proposed to the mind. And judging is the perception of that relation between things, whether that relation be immutable and necessary, or mutable and separable.§

Judgement is that operation of the mind whereby we join two or more ideas together by one affirmation

* Lee, p. 302. † Ibid. p. 293. ‡ Ibid. p. 295. § Ibid. p. 302.
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or negation ; this tree is high, that horse is not swift, &c. which sentences are the effect of judgement, and are called propositions.*

C H A P. XV.

Of Probability.

§ 2, page 226. **P**ROBABILITY does not supply the defect of knowledge ; for even in the lowest degree of it, there is some knowledge or certainty, but rather supplies the want of evidence to make any thing fully known or certain.†

C H A P. XVII.

Of Reason.

§ 3, page 242. **T**HE common definition of reason is, that it is the faculty in the mind which infers the truth or falsehood of any proposition by its perception of the mutable or immutable relation between the parts of that, and other propositions with which it is compared.

The difference is, that of the four degrees or offices of this faculty, others reckon that of making the inference or conclusion to be the chief or only proper exercise of reason.‡

Ibid. Disposition is the ranging our thoughts in such order, as is best for our own and others conception and memory. The effect of this operation is called method.§

§ 4, *Ibid.* There is no one doubts, but the question is, whether such men do not in their discourses make syllogisms, though they never heard the word,

* Watts Log. p. 5.

† Lee, p. 304.

‡ *Ibid.* 313.

§ Watts Log. p. 6.

or their discourses would not be as intelligible, or when they do not, they are not longer looser and obscurer.

§ 4, page 251. But in all disputations the defendant may be required to explain his terms, if obscure, and fallacious, and if that be done this argument fails, or if it has any strength, it would be as valid against all sorts of discourse and conferences, for they are no less liable to the ambiguity of words than syllogistical form.*

§ 5, page 252. This is likewise the common practice in all sorts of conferences; if any one pretends to maintain any probable proposition, he that opposes it will make use of his strongest arguments and attack it in the weakest part, &c.†

§ 6, *Ibid.* *The rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may shew the connection of remote ones.*—'Tis true, he that uses a syllogism must find out the middle term himself. The form of placing his words won't do that: the question only is, whether that which he has prepared to say or write would not be as well or better expressed, in as few, and that as intelligible, in the form of a syllogism, as any other form of words.‡

§ 8, page 254. In this section I conceive there is a mistake about the rules of syllogisms, and a contradiction to his whole scheme of abstract general ideas. For, 1st, There are rules of syllogisms where every proposition is particular, and the conclusion right. This paper has a plain and regular superficies; this pen has not so, *ergo*, their figures are different. 2dly, If it be true, as I think it is, that every idea is a par-

* Watts Log. p. 314.

† *Ibid.* p. 315.

‡ *Ibid.*

ticular existence, then there can be no general abstract ideas. If, *ex. gr.* whiteness and triumph be ideas, then they are ideas only of a particular white body, and a particular triumph, and therefore all that he must mean by general abstract ideas, must be only the general names given to particulars, unless there could be ideas that are both general and particular, which I cannot comprehend.*

§ 14, *page 257.* Intuitive knowledge is no knowledge at all, but on supposition of the real existence of things without us, which is contrary to his method and meaning.†

§ 15, *Ibid.* Nor is demonstrative knowledge certain, but upon the like supposition.‡

§ 16, *page 259.* The author seems to have too much limited this faculty as he has that of rational knowledge, which is commonly extended to all such knowledge which leaves no room for a rational doubt, as in the case of human testimony, when certain; of divine, when vouched by miracles.§

§ 20, *page 260.* When the argument is drawn from any insufficient medium whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or answer it; this is *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

§ 21, *Ibid.* St. Paul often uses this *argumentum ad hominem* when he reasons with the Jews, and when he says, I speak as a man.

§ 22, *Ibid.* If an argument be taken from the nature and existence of things, or addressed to the

* Lee, p. 316. † *Ibid.* p. 318. ‡ *Ibid.* § *Ibid.* p. 319.

reason of mankind, 'tis called *Argumentum ad Judicium*.

Besides these Dr. Watts reckons *Argumentum ad Fidem*, when it is borrowed from some convincing testimony.

Argumentum ad Passiones, or *ad Populum*, when an argument is borrowed from any topics which are suited to engage the inclinations and passions of the hearers on the side of the speaker, rather than convince the judgement.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces.

§ 2, page 263. **F**AITH is the assent of the mind to any propositions where the relation between its parts is not discoverable by the use of our natural faculties, but the reason of the assent is divine testimony.

§ 3, *Ibid.* We are apt to think, that if God pleases by immediate revelation to give to any persons the knowledge of such objects or greater degrees of those sensations, that he can furnish those persons with power by words or other signs to produce the like ideas or perceptions in others, which were communicated in the original revelation. But this, if granted possible, as there is not the least reason to deny, yet will not, I confess, amount to the forming new simple ideas; but there is no need of it, for the modes of substances which we know already are capable of an infinite variety in degrees and mixtures, and the words we have equally capable of being formed into an infinite number of propositions, so that in order to make divine or supernatural discoveries, there will no need of more

* Watts Log. p. 311.

organ of sense, of new words, or new modes of substances: and why God should not be able to represent a new scene of things to the imagination, as we find it daily by men in the description of foreign animals, plants, &c. is to me unaccountable. St. Paul does not say they were such degrees of pleasure that he had no conception of, or were incommunicable to others; but the contrary, in the words following: God hath revealed them to us by his spirit.*

§ 4, *page 265.* But this must be limited to traditional revelation only, for it seems too great a restraint of the Divine Power to suppose God cannot make the coherence of the parts of any proposition as plain to any one's mind immediately, as by his external senses, and there is no doubt but the inspired prophets had as clear a view of past and future events as if they had seen them.†

§ 5, *page 266.* But, 1st, It is to be considered, whether a person's own probity may not be as certainly known to himself, as any ideas he can have in his mind: or whether a person's knowledge that he has the power of working miracles may not as thoroughly convince him that his revelation comes from God, as any rational deductions whatever can satisfy him of any sort of truth.

2dly. It seems derogatory to the Divine Power, that it should not extend so far as to make any thing plain by words or other signs, by lively impressions upon the imagination of the person inspired, as the person himself can by his own senses, or use of his natural faculties.‡

§ 6, *page 267.* But if Divine Revelation be the only object of Divine Faith, and no revelation can be

* Lee, p. 324.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid, p. 327.

sufficiently

sufficiently known to come from God but either by seeing some inspired person writing, or hearing him to speak, or some other person vouching every particular miracle, than the Holy Scriptures can afford us no secure ground for divine faith, which is carrying the point too far : for, 1st, It is not plain, that *faith has to do*, &c. for I cannot see a reason why the laws of nature may not be called divine laws, and assent given to some proposition of divine faith, for it is supposed there are several propositions worthy of a rational assent, and yet are the objects of a divine faith only for their being farther confirmed by revelation ; as the immortality of the soul ; so that rational assent and divine faith seem to differ only or chiefly in the degrees of evidence, and make no manner of alteration in the reason of human actions.*

* Lee, p. 327.

